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THt UNANI.lvHTY NORlV! IN DELA'NARE 
CORPORATE LAW 
David A. Skeel, Jr.· 
INTRODUCTION 
OVER the last several decades, the Justices of the United States Supreme Court have issued an increasing number of 
separate opinions. It is not at all uncommon fo r there to be 
three or more opinions in a single case, particularly when con-
troversial issues are decided. Nor is this tendency limited to the 
Supreme Court. 1 One sees similar, though less dramatic, trends 
in appellate courts throughout the country. 
Things were not always this way. In the early years of the Su-
preme Court, John Marshall quite deliberately rejected the 
English tradition of issuing seriatim opinions and helped to es-
tablish a practice of producing a single opinion in each case.2 
IVIany observers believe that speaking with a single voice greatly 
·Associate Professor of Law, Te mple Un ivers ity. I am gra teful to Michael Dooley, 
Mik e Klarman, Saul Levmore, Jim Lin dgren , Geoff Mi ll e r, Ed Rock, Max Stearns, 
and Ted White for helpful commen ts and conversations, and owe special tha nk s to 
Chief Justice Norman Veasey, Justice Randy Holl and and Delaware Supreme Court 
Administrator Steve Taylor for extre mely hel pfu l disc ussions on the workings of 
Delaware's supreme court. T hey of course should no t be seen as endorsing any of 
the views I set forth in the Artic le . I would also iike to thank the Olin Foundation for 
generous funding during a semester visitorshi p at the U niversity of Virginia School of 
Law and Temple Law Schoo! for generous summer funding. 
1 T hroughout the Articl e, I capita li ze "Supre me Court" and "Court" when refer-
ring to the U nited States Supreme Court , and I use lower case when referring to th e 
Delaware "supreme court" in order to minimize confusion. Likewise, I capitalize 
"J ustice" when referring to me mbers of the Supreme Court , !:l nd use the lower case 
"justice" when referring to members of the supreme court. 
2 See, e.g., Herbert A. Johnson, Introduction: T he Business of the Court, in 2 The 
O liver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the United States: 
Foundations of Power: John Marshall, 1801-15 , at 373, 380-81 (Paul A. Freund ed., 
1981); Meredith Kolsky, Note, Justice William Johnson and the History of the 
Supreme Court Dissent, 83 Geo. L.J. 2069,2073-75 (1995). 
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enhanced the credibility of a Court that had previously been 
dismissed as ineffectual and blatantly political. 3 
Although the strong pattern of unanimity had weakened 
somewhat by the end of Marshall's tenure as Chief Justice ,4 the 
writing of separate opinions was discouraged on many appellate 
courts throughout the nineteenth century and into the early 
twentieth century. Only if a judge fe lt extraordinarily strongly 
about an issue was he likely to write separately. By the 1940s, 
the picture looked entirely different , with judges authoring 
separate opinions almost as a matter of course, particularly in 
cases that rai sed controversial issues.5 Thus, when the Supreme 
Court made a point of issuing unanimous decisions in several 
important desegregation cases,6 the Court 's unanimity seemed 
all the more striking. 
3 See Kolsky, supra note 2 , a t 2075-76 (reviewing commentators). 
-' Justice Willia m Johnson is often cited as having reintroduced no nunanimity in 
the Supreme Court. Johnson was appointed by Presid ent Jefferson, who strongly 
opposed the Supreme Court's practi ce of unanimity, and who urged Johnson to write 
separately. Id . at 2078-79; see also Le tter fro m T homas Jefferson to William Johnson 
(Oct. 27, 1822), in 12 The Works Of T homas Jefferson 246, 249-50 (PaulL. Forded ., 
1905) (contending that seriatim opinions are far more effective a t holding judges 
individually accountable, because judges can hid e behind the fa<;ade of un a nimous 
opinions). 
5 There is no obvious explanation as to why the urge fo r una nimity disappeared . 
A t th e Supreme Co urt leve l, it seems lik e ly that the increasing complexity of the 
issues that made th eir way to the Court may have bee n one factor, and that th e 
decline and eventual rejection of natural law theories was ano ther. See, e .g., Karl M. 
ZoBe l! , Division o f Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of Judici al 
D isi ntegration, 44 Cornell L.Q. 186, 202-03 (1959) (sugges ting that a side effect of 
Holmes' role in the "destruction of the myth of judicia l ce rta inty" was the creation of 
the idea that each judge 's view of a case is equally plausible , which encouraged th e 
proliferation of separa te opini ons) . For evidence of the magnitude of the shift in th e 
Supreme Court, see id . at 205 tbl. I (showing that only 11% of the Court's opinions in 
1930 were non unanimous, but that this percentage rose to we ll over half by 1943, and 
was over 70% for most of the 1950s). 
6 In Brown v. Board of Ed ucati on, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), Chief Justi ce Warren 
succeeded in persuadi ng all of the members of the Court to join his opinion reversing 
the "separate but equal " doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1 896) . A nd , in 
Coope r v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), the Justices issued a coauthored , unanimous 
opinion reaffirming th eir commitment to Brown in the face of overt res istance in 
Arkansas . T he Justices viewed un animity as crucial to underscoring th e ir commit-
me nt to desegregation, a nd to heading off the risk tha t recalcitrant Southern sta tes 
wou ld seize on a dissent as a mea ns of continuing the ir opposition. Perhaps th e best 
account of Chief Justice Warre n 's effort s to insure unanimity in Bro wn , and of th e 
perceived importance of presenting a united front , is Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: 
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The proliferation of separate opinions has produced a great 
deal of hand-wringing in some quarters. Critics of the apparent 
fragmentation insist that writing separately tends to undermine 
the collegiality of a court and, at its worst , can erode the legiti-
macy of the court's pro:nouncements.7 Other com mentators, al-
though emphasizing the need to maintain j1·dicial civility, have 




that dissenting and concurring opinions force the rnaj ority to 
sharpen its focus, and can si£mal both i~he limitations of the rna-. '-' 
jority's analysis and the likelihood that the decision will , or at 
least may, be overruled at a later date .8 
What neither the critics nor the proponents of writing sepa-
rately have noticed is that an important state supreme court 
stands in striking contrast to the current pattern. The D elaware 
supreme court, which has long been recognized as our preemi-
nent authority on state corporation law, rarely issues separate 
opinions. Even on deeply controversial issues, such as those 
that arose during the takeover wave of the 1980s, Delaware 's 
justices almost invariably speak with a single voice. 
Although it is perhaps understandable that Supreme Court 
scholars have not noticed the Delaware supreme court's pen-
chant for unanimity, corporate law scholars seem not to have 
picked up on it either. Corporate law commentators have ana-
lyzed and debated Delaware 's role in corporate law for decades, 
T he History of Brown v. Board of E ducacion a nd Black America's Struggle fo r 
E quality 679-99 (1975). For another example of Supreme Cou rt unanimity in ad-
dressing a se nsitive issue , see U nited States v. Nixon, 418 U .S. 683 (1974) (Nixon 
tapes case). 
7 See, e.g., Ruth Bader G insburg, R emarks on Writing Separately, 65 Wash. L. 
Rev. 133, 138-45 (1990) (suggesting that Un ited States judges sh ould exercise more 
res tra int before writing separately); Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis 
and Reform 236-43 (1985) (arguing that although it would be "a great error to 
suppress" separate opinions, in some cases, separa te op inions can "communicate a 
se nse of the law's instability that is mis leading"); Z oBel! , supra note 5, at 211-14 
(suggesting judges should consider the und esirabl e effects of dissenting as well as the 
reasons for disse nt); id. at 203 n.98 (citing other literature on the " problem" of 
separate opinions). 
s See, e.g., Wi lliam J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Disse nts, 37 Hastings L.J. 427 
(1986); Edward McG lynn Gaffney, J r. , T he Importance of D issent and the 
Imperative of Judicial Civili ty, 28 Va l. U. L. Rev. 583 (1994); Kolsky, supra note 2, at 
2082-87; see also Kevin M. Stack, Note, The Practice of D issent in the Supre me 
Court, 105 Yale L.J. 2235 (1996) (arguing that the practice of dissent is justified no t in 
terms of th e rule of law, but in terms of ideals of deliberative democracy). 
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yet none has fully acco unted for this crucial component of the 
judicial process.9 
My purpose in this Article is to explore in detai l the implica-
tions of the D elaware supreme court's tendency to issue unani -
mous ODinions-a oractice I will refer to as Delaware 's 
' . •. . "10 '.--, . ' b f . ·'unammrty norm. · 'u1ven tne a sence o,_ pnor commentary on 
the unanimity norm , I begin, in Part I, by showing the e xtertt to 
which Dela;,vare 's decisions are in fact overwhelmingly unani -
mous. I then describe the practices that seem to make unan im-
ity possible in Deiaware in an era when so few other rnodern 
courts are characterized by a unanimous decisionmaking proc-
ess. 
Part II explores the effects of unanimity on the development 
of D elaware corporate law doctrine. My initial assessment em-
phasizes what on the surface appears to be a particularly trou-
blesome consequence of the unanimity norm, as compared to a 
nonunanimity regime. Drawing from the extensive recent li tera-
ture on social choice, I argue that unanimity magnifies the like-
lihood of "cycling" and cycling-like effects-that is, of shifts by 
the supreme court from one doctrinal approach to another. 11 I 
illustrate this concern with an example based on, and in many 
respects exemplified by, a series of unanimously decided Dela-
ware takeover cases. rv1y conclusion that unanimity magnifies 
the risk of cycling raises the question of why, given its effects, 
the unanimity norm is likely to have evolved and survived. T he 
obvious answer, that D elaware's unanimity norm reinforces the 
credibility of the supreme court , does not seem especially help-
9 l am aware of only on e law review article that eve n mentions Delaware's 
tendency to speak with a unanimous vo ice. See Jeffrey N. Gordo n. Corpo.-ations, 
Mark e ts, and Co urts, 91 Colum. L. Re v. 1931, 1968-69 (1991) (alluding to th e fact 
that Delaware's takeover cases have bee n consisten tly unanimous). 
' 0 I use th e term " norm" somewh at ad vised ly , given the burgeoning litera ture o n 
norms in legal scholarship. In describing an aspect of Delaware supreme co urt 
decisionmaking as a norm, I employ the term more broadly than those who treat 
norms as necessaril y nonlegal in nature. For an excellent introduction to the current 
legal literature on norms, see Symposium, Law, Economics , & Norm s, 144 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1643 (1996). 
" The problem of cycling also is referred to as the "Condorce t Paradox ," after the 
French mathematician and phil osopher Marquis de Co ndorcet , who was on e of th e 
first scholars to identify and explore the paradox. For a de tailed description of the 
cycling problem, see infra Par t IL 
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fu l by itself. Although unanimity does have this effect , it does 
no t seem necessary in order to reinforce Delmvare's stature in 
corporate law in the same way as the I'vfarshall Court may have 
needed unanimity to reinforce its sta tute in constitutional law. 
1 ~ ~ro ..J "" ~V ... h . . . v 'd . l . 
..~.n r'arts h t anu l or t1,e Article , 1 cons1 er two a1terna trve 
l • -~ T"'\ y >r-r 7 t • 
exp lanations. 1n rart l ll , 1 exp,ore an mterest group accoun.t 
that suggests an important purpose of unanimity may be to 
benefit Del aware's coroorate bar. A ft er concludimz tha t this 
~ ~ 
, . . 1 'bl ' . 1 • 1 . explanation JS p>aus1 .e out mcomp1ete m. severa Important re ·· 
spects I consider, in Part IV, v.;hether unanimity reinforces a 
moral d imension of the Delaware case law.12 Only by taking the 
sunreme court 's role as moral arbiter of di rectorial b ehavior 
~ 
into account is it possible to fully appreciate the role of unanim-
ity on the court. lVioreover, attending to the moral d imension of 
the cases reduces some of the concerns about the perverse ef-
fects of unanimity. I argue in particular that , even when the 
court's doctrine is unstable, the outcome in the cases often is 
more predictable. 
As this brief overview suggests, I focus throughout the Article 
on the role of unanimity in the development of corporate law. 
As I hope wi ll be obvious, however , the analysis also is gener-
alizable in many respects, and offers useful insights on broader 
questions as to the costs and benefits of unanimous and nonu-
nanimous judicial regirnes . 
I. T HE ROAD TO UNANIMITY: HOV/ DELAWARE GETS THERE 
Delaware's norm of unanimity differs markedly from the de--
cisionmaking practices of other high courts. Aside from occa-
sional, high -profile exceptions and a brief attempt at unity dur-
ing the Marsh all Court era, the Justices of the Supre me Court , 
as noted above, have always issued multiple opinions in a sig-
nificant percentage of their cases. 13 State high courts have gen-
12 Ed Rock has provided the most systematic account of this underappreciated 
moral role of Delaware decisionmaking. See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: 
The Peculiar Mechanisms of Delaware Corpora te Law (Mar. 5 , 1996) (unpublished 
manuscript , o n file with the Virginia Law Review Association). 
13 My focus in thi s paper is on high court decisionmaking, but it is perhaps worth 
noting tha t intermediate courts o f appeal a lso are characterized by a multiplicity of 
opinions , though to a lesser extent. Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 147. In addition , 
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erally been less divided than the Supreme Court, perhaps in part 
1 ,, ., ' ,. h 0 0 l 0 • • 1 ' oecause mey spena less or t · e1r tlme reso_vmg parucuwny con-
tested issues. Yet rnost state high courts also issue a significant 
number of separate opinions. In California, to take a rela tively 
dramatic exampl·~, the high court issued lTH.d tiple opinions in 
' h ar .a .. L f ." + .,...... .,..,·'>-or1 '"'AI ,. .' .; r-. ·r•s ; n 1 Q Q .c;' more t\lan seven P··y.\ C\~nL or ltS 1epoH,..,u uedSn.J.l 1i 1 .c '::>'./.J. 
Even the high of the less obviously heterogenous sta te of 
I na,l. '1Dt.:) T~j~ t:' a~~,.i ~ .,·!ad Y) Prq·"!y th~ Tty-fi ve ·oerce-r\·;- l'·.f 1 ~rj ~P ~\. im· ' p 14 .. . .. C.> c, I O. J -" 1 1\.., <~-·-' c .. ,,G~! · _,,L · _ , " L c ·~~ • -·" ·~ "-"• -~. 
Tho Da1<;.~--lf~'""' ""'"''·"'-.,-, o '' O"rt could 1-, ard 'y ho ·r~~"""' n; f fw-an·> J:...ti'·.~ ..:U·\ .... .ta ~;, ~::....i ~~_.... ::.J\_ i.~J :. vl.iil.,..,.. ·\...-· u_.:.. ,.. l 1"" · l - J'v . . ~ l.O...)A·,_... ;,...:. .~ .!.. - ... ...,._l ~· "';... . 
Dela>;vare 's justices write separately in only three percent of the 
court' s reported cases . The percentage is even lo,Ner \Vhen con-
sidering the cou rt 's whole docket. '5 T he minuscule nu.mber o f 
separate opinions is particularly noteworthy given that the su-
preme court, tmhke many state high courts , is the national arbi-
ter of an important and often controversial area of law.'6 
appe lla te judges routinely issue separate opinions in the cases the y hear e n bane. 
1" These perce ntages an: derived from a series of WESTLA W searches I conducted 
on the high courts of several states. For detailed search parameters , see Appendix A. 
With respect to Caiifornia, I counted 69 nonunanimous decisions-49 wi th at least 
one dissent , and 20 with concurrences a lone-out of roughly 106 reported decisions 
in 1995 . (I defined reported decisions for the purposes of my searches to exclude 
ru lings on certiorari and pro forma decisions, even if they were included in a 
reporter) . For Indiana, my search revealed 58 nonunanimous decisions (42 with 
disse nts, 16 wirh concurrences alone) out of 167 in 1995, or 34.7 %. 
1; I give a more de tail ed breakdown in Appendix A , which anal yzes the output of 
the supreme court from 1960 to 1996. A sta tistical analysis of this data done by J im 
Lindgren using logistic regressio n in SPSS 7.5 made cl ear that the De la ware supreme 
co urt has mai ntained a consistent commitment to uniformity over [he entire tim e 
period 1 conside red . Professo r Lindgren used the year of the case as the predictor 
variab le and whet he r there was a separa te opinion as the response variable. The 
positive tre nd was so tiny (B==.008 1; R== .OOOO) that there was no mea ningful trend in 
the data. If these data had been a sample rather than the enti re popu lation , the 
results would not have been statistically significant. My thanks to Pro fessor Lindgre n 
for the statistical help. 
16 Of the 20 or so states 1 looked at, o nly Rhode Island (four in 1995) and New 
Hampshi re (five in 1995 ) we re comparably stingy to Delaware in issu ing separate 
op ini ons. Beca use these sta tes, like De laware, are geographically small and have 
small (five-member) high co urts, one might initially be tempted to conclude that 
smailness of state and of court are the principal determinants of how freq ue ntly a 
state high court is likely to issue separate opinions. Yet a quick loo k at comparable 
states immed iately complicates the picture . 
T he high courts of geographically small states often are not coh es ive. For instance, 
the Connecticut h igh court was divided 44 times in 1995 , while the New Jersey high 
co urt was divided 29 times. Small co urt size can also be misle ading. T he North 
Dakora and South Dako ta high courts, both of which (like Delaware) have five 
members , had 60 and 54 nonunan imous opin ions respectively in 1995 . A nd, as noted 
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T wo facets of the Delaware judicial system serve as a starting 
point for understanding the supreme court 's ability to speak 
with a unifi ed voice. T he first is Delaware's selection process. 
Many states popularly elect their high court judges. In Dela-
v.;are , by contrast, the B ar Association plays a central rote in de-
. . ' ·r· . h ' . , . termmmg wno WI 1 srt on L e supreme court , mucn as 1t aoes rn 
proposing changes to Delaware 's General Corporate Lav1. 1i .A 
nominating commission , one of whose members is appoin 1:ed by 
the Executive Committee of the Delaware Bar Association, 
does all of the initial screening, then submits a list of annrc-rri ·· 
ate candidates to the governor. 13 Although the governo; has \ :he 
fina l say as to who serves on the court, he or she chooses from a 
short list prepared by the commission. 19 
earlier, Indiana 's five-just ice high court had 58. See supra note 14. Eve n the 
combination of a small state and a small court is far from foolproof as an indica tor, as 
evidenced by the fact that Vermont's five-member supreme cou rt issued 26 
nonunanimous decisions in 1995 . Thus , a lthough I discuss the significance of 
De laware 's small court further below, see infra text accompanying notes 22-26, small 
co urt and small state only begin to explain Delaware's unanimity norm. I suggest 
seve ral addition al factors, each of which plays a crucial role , in the ana lysis th at 
foll ows. 
17 In the legislative context, the corporation law section of the D el aware Bar 
Association does nearly all o f the work in deve loping and drafting proposed 
amendments to the corporation law. Although th e two houses of the Delaware 
G enera l Assembly fo rmally enact th e amendments, the Ge neral A ssembly has 
tended (except o n one or two high-profil e occasions) simply to rubberstam p the 
proposa ls forwarded by the corporation law section. For a use ful acco ur.t of 
D elaware 's legislati ve process, see Curti s Alva, Delaware and th e Mark et for 
Co rporate Charters: H istory and Agency, 15 Del. J. Corp. L. 885, 903-16 (1990) ; see 
also Dav id A. Drexl e r, The G rowth of Corporate Law, in The De laware Bar in the 
Twenti e th Century 583, 594 (Helen L. Winslow, Anne E . Bookout & Pat ri cia C. 
Hannigan eds ., 1994) (he re in after T he De laware Bar) (noting an unwritten tradition , 
as o f the 1960s, that De laware 's G en eral Assembly never consid ere d a proposed 
corpora te law amendment unless the Bar Assoc ia tion had reco mmended it ). 
18 In addition to the Bar A ssociation representative , the commiss ion includes eight 
members selected by the governor, four of whom must be members of the Delaware 
supreme court bar and four of whom cannot be members of any bar. See Del. Exec. 
Order No.3, Mar. 29, 1993 § 1 (on file with th e Virginia Law Review Association) . T he 
importance of the loca l ba r's ro le was underscored by a subsequent executive o rder that 
makes clear that the commission can disclose confidential information to the Bar 
Association 's Committee o n Judicia l Appointments. See Del. Exec. O rder No. 10, A ug. 
20, 1993 § 1 (amending Del. Exec. O rder No. 3 § 6) (on fil e with the Virginia Law 
Review Association). 
19 The commission is req uired to submit not less than three nominees un less the 
entire commission agrees to submit fewer. See Del. Exec. O rd er No.3, sup ra note 18, 
§ 7. The bar 's influence was particularly striking when Justice Andre 'N Moore's 12-
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Judicial nominations do alternate between the two pol itical 
parties,20 but as the discussion thus far suggests, the process is 
largely divorced from party politics in practice and is in that 
sense apoliticaL Moreover, the local bar-and thr·ough it the 
nominating cornrnission--is acutely aware of Delaware's tradi--
tional orominence in corvo:rate law, and of the value of ore-
.~. ,:,_ !. 
• 1 • - T L • • ' • ' • • • 
Sef\llllg tflat ·.L' rorn. ll1:E:i-~ C e. f\1'-0 t SU.fDI1Slngty, Ttle C:.QTrlTl1lSSll1Tl lS 
'-" t J. .. _ 
...... '") r~fu i ·to ·r->.r(""~-· ,ry~~ ~ 1; r-1117; r1 11 ~ 1 :;' 'J.;t. ;h 0 c "n· 0 , .. o I" h (-' ~ 0:1 rn 0 ·ro.,L"":lT'"''V"'j pr ·f ~ ·~ 1,0 21 \....-U. ... \,....-.1. _ .b-' .... ·u_yv ._,. ._,...... .t.!.t•--'l .::. ·'1 i "t. ... ~ .. :L "--4..:. 0 V'f L... .._, .::.Lt .L\....- .:.. .- .. ..~ ~ -C.. ! .-. .lt .. .~ _}J\. .. _._ ~}/""'~ ·-vJ...~ '1~- . 
A c a ~e·;;; u:l t T":i r· 1 ~l·,·: '?rP'c: c.:upremP cu~ l l Y\" 'l. 'l'' i· ic· e '~ a·"p '"~ ' ··n r ;·,- p. ~ .t . ...-L..J ~, .:.....J_,.r. ..._Y¥Cl ~ ·v ::J ~ - .1. ~ - .-. -. ._ JL .JL .• -J,,..~ J...., .ll..A. ...._ 1.:. ... L- .1.. ..,.. 
likely to be of like mind on the general gosJs of corporate la-;,v 
than are the me:r.nbers of other high courts. 
A second factor contributing to the tendency towards una-
nimity is the size of the supreme court. Delaware 's supreme 
court comprises only five justices , as compared to the high 
courts of many other states, which have seven or more mem-
bers, and the nine-member Supreme Court.22 I t was cornprised 
year term expired in 1994 . Rather than a list of multiple qu al ifi ed candidates, the 
nominating commiss ion excluded Moore and submitted exactly one name to the 
governor-Vice Chancellor Carolyn Berger. See Richard B. Schmitt, Delaware 
Governor Picks Trial Judge For Supreme Court, Wall St. J. , May 26, 1994, at B7 . l 
discuss the bar's opposition to Justice Moore further infra note 91 and accompanying 
text. 
' 0 See De l. Canst. art. rv, § 3. 
'
1 Of course, not a il of the supreme court's cases are corporate law cases. Roughly 
one half o f the court's cases are criminal, a nd corporate cases co mpr is•..: a minority of 
th e civil cases. See A dministra tive Office of the Courts, 1995 A nnual Report fo r the 
De laware Judiciary 31 [hereinafter Delaware An nual Report] (207 d ispositions in 
criminal appe als and 249 in civil ap peals for fiscal year 1995). But the corporate law 
cases have an obvious prominence due to the importance o f corporation-based 
income to Delaware 's economy. Corporat ion cases also differ some wh at from cases 
on crim in al and tort law iss ues due to Delaware's two- tier jud icia l system. Cases on 
corporate and commercial law arc heard in the chancery court, a court of e quity . 
Other cases are heard in Delaware's superior court in the first instance. 
' 2 No sta te has fewer than five members on its highest court; six states have nine 
members on the ir highest court, twenty-six states have seven , and e ighteen states 
(including Delaware) have five. V./ant 's Federa l-State Co urt Directory 125-77 
(RobertS. Wanted. , 1994). Severa l corporate law commentators hav e pointed to th e 
smail size of De laware's judiciary, which consists of the five chancery judges who 
comprise the lower equity court, toge ther with the five-member supreme co urt , as an 
important factor in its decisionmaking process in corporate law cases. Most 
prom inently, Ro berta Romano suggests that the small size of the judiciary increases 
th e certa inty of Del aware 's case law, a nd thus enhances De laware 's a ttractiveness for 
corporations. Roberta Romano, T he Genius o f American Corporate Law 40 ( 1993) 
[hereinafter Geniu s]; Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the 
Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. Econ. & O rg. 225, 277 (1985). 
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of three justices"' until 1978, when the court's bun::eoning 
caseload forced it to expand to five justices."" A nd, in ~ sense~ 
the expansion was only partial ; the supreme court continues to 
hear cases in three-justice panels, rather than (as most other 
1 • ., 1 " "'= :s rr'lh h ~ state mgn courts c1o) en oanc. - 1 us, t e supreme court tunc-
tions in some respects as if it were even smaller than it i=-
'T '1-IP imnl';c;;o. tiox·l..: f o -,· ' 1 '1 ~I1 i n1 i -'-Lv "I.~ t1'1 "' " "llDre l·,--, o ~n i-:r ·:-·' ." •:· .,.-,~_, -;oi .i ..... 1~....., ~ . t-' l .....,. ... '-' ..:~._ L U.1- C.. J. .z_ . ... }.:.. J V L \.,... ~ .1 ..... . .tt\...,... \.....-'--" ._. .... .,. .__ , ~ .. .it. J'.'c... l. ) . • ~ 
. . "LY . ,., ~ ' . 1 1 "' , • ., ~ • sEe are ciear: 1 1avmg tev;er dec1s10nma cers reauces tne nKeJl -
1-- ___] h r •. • h , . . , 11 d . .· -, . 1 uoou t _at racuons among L e J usttces Wl un ermme tw::: ::oun s 
commitr.nent to speaking with a unanimous voice . Yet s-::lection 
proce s and sm all size almost certainly can not by thernselves 
ensure unanimity. One can easily imagine that an inte rest in ju--
dicial reputation or simply differing views on important issues 
could cause one or more justices to write separately with some 
regularity. 26 That a justice must be reappointed after twelve 
years mitigates the desire to write separately, but the reap-
pointment check is at most a limited one.27 
To more fully explain the court's success in consistently issu-
ing unanimous decisions , we need to consider a third factor: the 
:.1 Th e three-justice co urt was inst ituted in 1951. Prior to 1951, Delaware had no 
perman ent supreme court justices. It employed a "leftover judge" syste m, pursuant 
to which lower court judges who had no t been involved in a given case const ituted 
the "supreme court " for the purposes of resolving a n appeal. See Paul Dolan , The 
Supreme Cour t of De laware . 1900-1 952, 56 Dick . L. Rev. 166, 166 (1 952) . 
:-1 Henry R. Horsey & William Duffy, The Supreme Court A fter i 951: Th e 
Separate Sup reme Court , in T he Delaware Bar, supra note 17, a t 384, 384-85 (noting 
that as case filings tripled between the 1960s and 1970s, Chief Justice Herma nn called 
for an expanded court, which was eventually provided by the legislature in 
November, 1978). 
25 En bane hearings are req uired in certain circumstances. See Del. Sup. C t. R. 
4(d); Del. Sup. Ct. internal O p. P. YI!(l)-(7). I di scuss the particular requirements 
in fra note 31 and accompanying text. 
: 6 Notice the contrast 'Nith a nonunanimity regime . Under un animity , justices have 
an ongoing incentive to write separately , and to free ride on the other justices' 
co llective committment to un a nimity. Nonunanimity regimes a rc Iik e iy to be more 
stable because they do not present similar opportunities for free riding. 
: 7 See, e.g. , Del. Exec. O rd er No. 3, supra note 18, at § 11 ("S itting judges who are 
'Willing to be reappointed sha ll not be denied recommendation by the Commission 
except upon the affirmative vo te of at least two-third s of the members. " ). 
A noth er factor that seems likely to enhance consensus, at least o n th e margin, is 
that the Delaware supreme court does no t have certiorari powers, a nd thus does not 
select cases with an eye to developing th e case law. 
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court's internal operating procedures. 28 U nder the courf s inter-
nal procedures, the justices ordinarily do not discuss cases u:n ti l 
after oral argument.29 Further, cases are assigned with an eye to 
discouraging the development of specialties. 30 Both practices 
tend to encourage the kind of consensus that is reflected in the 
court 's ovinions . 
' T" ' 1 l (:" r , , • 1 ._he most remancao e i.eature or tne court .; mterna1 proce-
dures , hmvever , is that they impose a signific21.nt cost on dis -
senting from a panel opinion . Both the Supreme Court R ules 
and the Internal Operating Procedures provide for an automatic 
en bane hearing in the event of any panel disagreement.'1 Thus, 
a justice can write separately only if he or she is 'willing to force 
a fu ll court hearing and continues to adhere to his or her origi-
nal posi tion. In consequence, a dissent is likely to emerge only 
under extraordinary circumstances. 
In short, almost every aspect of the evolution of D elaware su-
preme court decisionmaking-from the selection of justices, to 
the court's small size, to its rules and internal operating proce-
'
3 T he principa l sources of the court's practices are the Delaware Supreme Court 
Rules an d its Internal O perating Procedures. Until 1994, the Internal Operating 
Proced ures were simpl y informa l norms o f practice that th e court e mployed. The 
proced ures were codified in 1994, after two new justi ces joine d the court. Telephone 
Intervi ew with Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey (J une 1996) [here in a fter Veasey 
Interv iew]. 
'
9 De l. Sup. C t. Intern a l O p. P. IX( l ) . It is inte rest ing to note th a t jurors in both 
civi l an d cr imin a l trials opera te under similar stri ctures aga inst disc uss ing a case 
outside of the fo rmal decisionmak ing process . As with the sup re me court, it see ms 
likely th at one effec t of the practice is to enco urage consensus. 
'
0 De l. Sup. C t. Intern al Op. P. VI(2). G iven that the ch ief j ustice has ultimate 
respon sibility for ov ersee ing the panel assignment process, see id. V 1(1 ), the effect of 
the policy against speciali zation obviously depends on how the chief justice wie lds his 
o r her a uthority. 
" De l. Sup. C t. R. 4(d); Del. Sup. Ct. In te rn a l Op. P. V II (cases un able to garner a 
unanimous opini o n move automatically to en bane considerat ion) . T he rationale for 
requiring that divided opinions be heard en bane is that a split opinion does not 
retl ect the vo tes of a majority of the fiv e-me mber co urt. Veasey Inte rvi ew, supra 
note 28 . Ot her cases tha t present grounds for an e n bane hea ring incl ude cases that 
will poss ibly overturn a Delaware precedent, capital cases, a nd cases that two justices 
vote to hear en bane. Del. Sup. Ct. Intern al Op. P. VII. 
Interestingly, the supreme court does no t tell th e pa rties o r otherwise ma ke clear 
the reason why it is rehea ring a case en bane. Veasey Interview, supra note 28. This 
suggests that if the full court la te r issues a unanimous opinion , as it often does, 
obse rve rs may no t know wheth er it was th e prospect of disagreeme nt o r of ove rruling 
prior precedent tha t precipitated the full co urt 's review. 
1997] Unanimity Norm 137 
dures-reinforces the court 's tendency to speak with a single 
vmce. 
II. TJ :t-.JANIMITY AND D OCTRINAL C YCLING 
Identifying the tendency toward unanimity, and the factors 
reinforcing it, raises a crucial question: \Vhat d ifference does 
unanimity m ake, as compared to an alternative regime? lhe 
obvious ans-...ve r is that unanimity may stabilize the case law, 
since it eliminates the possibility that fragmentation vvill cast 
doubt on the court's reasoning in a given area. 
Yet unanimity can have almost precise ly the opposite effect. 
T he suggestion that unanimity may undermine the clari ty of a 
court's decisions is not new,32 but previous commentators h ave 
tended simpiy to note this without exploring it in any sys tematic 
way. My goal in the analysis that follows is to use the insights of 
social choice theory to provide a much more detailed assess-
ment of the effects of unanimity. 33 
Because I am primarily concerned with unanimity in D ela-
ware corporate law cases, I focus on D elaware's takeover cases34 
and use an illustration based loosely on these cases to demon-
strate (among other things) how unanimity may magnify the risk 
of doctrinal cycling. In addition to showing the effects of una-
nimity, my analysis helps to explain an enduring irony of Dela-
ware corporate law: the fact that , while stability is often recited 
as one of the reasons for D elaware 's success in attracting corpo-
rations, D elaware 's doctrine in several crucial are as appears, at 
32 See, e .g. , Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court , 95 Harv. L. Rev. 
802 , 810 & n.23 (1982) (suggesting that th e contine ntal trad iti on of unanimity is 
characte ri zed by short, platitude-filled opinions that prov ide littl e guid a nce). 
33 For useful analyses of other corporate law issues in soci a l choice terms, see 
William J . Carn e y, Does Defining Constitu encies Matte r? , 59 Ci n. L. R ev. 385 , 420-
22 (1990) (detailing perve rse effects of "other constitue ncy "' statutes); J e ffrey N. 
G ordon, Shareho ld er Initi a tive: A Soci a l Ch o ice and G ame Theoretic A pproach to 
Corporate Law, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. 347 (1991) (suggesting that cycling concerns may 
justify absolute de legation rule that preve nts shareholders fro m initia ting mos t 
corporate decisions) ; see a lso David A. Skee l, Jr. , Some Corpo rate and Securities 
Law Perspectives on Student-Athle tes and the NCAA, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 669, 679-82 
(reviewing social choice effects of stud ent-athle te represe ntation in NCAA 
decisionmaking). 
).1 Every one of th e hostil e takeover cases I discuss was unanimo us. 
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least on initial inspection, to be remarkably unstab1e. 35 
A . Social Choice and Delaware Takeover Law 
In order to set the stage for the social choice analysis that 
foEov;s, I begin by briefly describing the doctrinal devdoprn ents 
., . .. ; , .. • ... .. • ,.. '! • ~ 
t hat vnlr serve as tne bas1s tor our exp10rat10n m: tne u.•:J anEl.·nty 
norm. In the mid-1980s, the dramatic increase in takeovers gave 
rise to a series of cases that posed a particularly cE:f:ficult d i-
lemma for Delaware judges. In the face of a hosti le bid , or 2 
contest between fr iendly and hostile bidders, the d in:.cto:cs of a 
target corporation often took measures to prevent the hostile 
bidder from acquiring control. For instance , target company 
managers adopted or refused to remove "poison pill" devices36 
that were designed to make acquisition prohibitively expensive , 
or added supermaj ority voting requirements. Bidders re--
sponded by alleging that these efforts violated target directors' 
fiduciary duty to their shareholders. 
The dilemma for the Delaware supreme court was that target 
directors ' actions in the takeover context did not fi t neatly 
within either of the traditional categories used in addressing fi -
duciary duty issues. 37 Target managers have an obvious conflict 
' 5 Professors Macey and Mille r have suggested a n inte rest gro up explanation fo r 
the occasio na l e le me nts of un ce rtainty in Delawa re law. Jonathan R . Macey & 
Geoffrey P. lVliller, Toward an Interes t-Gro up Theory o f D elaware C orporate Law, 
65 Tex. L Rev. 469, 498-509 (1 987) (suggesting th at Delaware law is uncertain 
e no ugh to a llow interest groups such as th e corporate bar to o btain re nts, b u t not so 
uncerta in as to give corpora ti o ns an incentive to incorporate elsewh ere) . Bu t they do 
no t address the significance of the supreme court 's tendency toward unan im ity. For a 
mo re de tail ed co nsid e ration of interest group issues , see infra Part Iif. 
·' 6 Poison pills take a varie ty of forms, mos t of which invo lve a promise by the 
target corporat ion to give stock or other securiti es to the firm 's sha re hold ers, or se ll 
them at a barga in price, in the eve nt of an acquisition of a specifie d po rtion of the 
target's stock. See Randall S. T homas, Judicia l Review o f Defensive Tactics in Proxy 
Contests: Whe n is Using a Rights Plan Right?, 46 Vand. L Rev. 503 , 510-11 (1993) . 
37 Oversimp li fy ing somewhat, directorial duties fa ll in to two gen eral ca tegories: the 
duty of ca re a nd the duty of loya lty. The duty o f care is , as the name suggests, an 
obliga tion that directors exercise appropriate care in making decisions fo r the firm. 
The business judgment rule acts as a presumption in most cases that a director has in 
fac t satisfi ed thi s obliga ti o n. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis , 473 A.2 d 805, 812 (De l. 
1984) (defining business judgme nt rule presumptio n). The duty of loyalty , which 
compri ses a var iety o f related obligations , applies if th e d irector has a conflict of 
interest, as whe n she enters into a transaction with th e corporation . For a good 
introdu cti on to directori a l duties, see Robert C. C lark , Co rpora te Law 123-89 (1986) . 
1"97l :;J . . I J Unanimity Norrn 139 
of interest in the takeover context, because they frequently will 
be replaced in the event of a takeover. Thus, the traditional 
deference that the du ty of care and business judgment ru le pro-
vide for d irectors vv'ho do no t have a conflict of interest did not 
seem in order. Yet the cases also were n ot classic du ty o f loyalty 
cases ., vih ich are subj ect to aggressive revie\v, because the d irec-
tors' conflict of interest , though very :rec:d; ~;v as rnuch less direct 
than iD a traditional duty of loyalty case . 
Dela\var;':'s response was to attempt to articula te an interme-
diate standard of review in the takeover cases . The sunreme 
l 
court has suggested in a series of decisions spanning the last 
decade that it will apply scrutiny that is greater than in most 
contexts , but not so searching as in true duty of loyalty cases. 38 
For the purposes of our analysis of unanimity, assume that 
D elaware has three justices/9 that the takeover cases have just 
arisen , and the justices' positions on the issue are as fo llows. 
Hypothe tical Justice Alden believes that target managers face a 
severe conflict of interest and should therefore be subject to sig-
nificantly enhanced scrutiny. That is, these cases are much more 
3s In the two most prominent ea rl y cases, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Pe trole um Co., 493 
A.2d 946 (De l. 1985) a nd Revl o n, Inc. v. MacA ndrews & Forbes H oldings. 506 A.2d 
173 (Dei. 1986) . the court held th at the directors' use of de fens ive measures must be a 
reasonably proportiona te response to a reasonab le be li e f that a hosti le bid 
constitu tes a threat, Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 , and that if it becomes clear that th e 
target is '·in play,'' the directors must foc us so le ly on obtain in g the best pr ice for 
shareho lders. Rev/on, 506 A .2d a t 184 n.16. These cases ca ll for an interme diate 
leve l of scrutiny, and thus correspond roughly to the "Enh anced Scrutiny" standard I 
describe below. 
Th e co urt has subseque ntl y engaged in several striking shifts. Most prom in ently , 
the court appeared to e mph asize director discretion in Paramount Commun ica tions 
v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (De l. 1989) [herein afte r Time- Wamer for short form case 
citati ons], only to shift once again to an approach loose ly anaiogous to the posit ion I 
describe below as "Shareholder Prerogative," in Para mount Comm unications v. QVC 
Network, 637 A.2d 34 (De l. 1993). I discuss these shifts, and the possibi li ty that they 
may amount to cycling, further infra note 75. The o th e r important cases in this 
doctrinal lin e are U nitrin, Inc. v. A me rican Gen. Corp., 65 1 A.2d 1361 (De l. 1995), 
Mi ll s Acqu isition Co . v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (De l. 1988), a nd Ivan hoe 
Partners v. Ne wmon t Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987). 
'" As noted earlie r , see supra tex t accompanying no tes 23-25, De lawa re's supreme 
court hears cases in three-justice panels, but the e ntire court hears the case in some 
circumstances . I assum e three justices in order to simpli fy the exposition , b ut the 
a nalys is that fo llows will hold true any time the just ices hol d three or more posit ions, 
no one pos ition is held by a majority, and any coalition comprising the justices 
holding two of the three pos iti o ns would garner a majority. 
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like duty of loyalty than duty of care cases and the court should 
therefore conduct a substantive review of every transaction the 
directors either approved or stymied. I will refer to this ap-
proach as "Enhanced Scrutiny." 
H ypothetical Justice Baker, by contrast, thinks a better ap-
proach is to focus on the shareholders of the target. In order to 
ensure that shareholders rather than directors ultimately retain 
control over the decision whether to accept a takeover bid, 
given the directors' conflict of interest in this context, Baker 
would forbid the directors from using defensive measures 
against a hostile bid except in two circumstances: (1) to facilitate 
an active auction;~0 or (2) if the shareholders would retain effec-
tive control of the corporation even after the directors thwarted 
a hostile bid and facilitated a merger with another, favored bid-
der. 41 Otherwise, the directors would not be permitted to inter-
fere with any tender offer or otherwise wrest control of the 
takeover decision from the shareholders.42 I will refer to this 
view as "Shareholder Prerogative." 
Finally, hypothetical Justice Clark believes that target direc-
tors should be given substantial discretion, both because D ela-
ware has long emphasized directors' authority to manage the 
corporation,43 and because the directors do not face a true con-
fli ct of interest in the takeover context. This position I will call 
"Director D iscretion. " 
"0 The rationale for permitting the directors to exercise control for the limited 
purpose of conducting an auction is that an auction will generally increase the 
takeover premium that shareholders receive, and shareholders are not well-
positioned to conduct the auction themselves. 
" 1 Baker 's second exception assumes there is less cause for concern if the 
shareholders retain ultimate control, and thus can reverse any transaction of which 
they disapprove. See, e.g., QVC, 637 A.2d at 45 (emphasizing the fact that the target 
shareholders would not retain control after the proposed transaction). 
·~ Baker's view is thus a variation of Easterbrook and Fischel 's " passivity thesis," 
which contends that directors should be prohibited from defending against a hostile 
bid in any way. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fi sche l, The Proper Role of a 
Target's Management in Respo nding to a Tender Offer , 94 Harv . L. Rev. 1161 
(1981). Unlike the passivity thesis, Baker's position would allow the directors to use 
defensive measures , but only in the narrow circumstances described in the text. 
"' See, e.g., Pogostin v. Rice , 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984) ("The bedrock of the 
Ge neral Corporation Law of Delaware is the rule that the business and affa irs of a 
corporation are managed by a nd under the direction of its board."). 
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Continuing the example, assume further that if the court did 
not select E nhanced Scrutiny, Alden would prefer that the jus-
tices choose Shareholder Prerogative rather than Director Dis-
cretion , due to her strong opinion that managers cannot be 
trusted with the takeover decision. Baker's second choice, after 
Shareholder Prerogative, v.;ould be Director Discretion, because 
she believes that courts are not well si tua ted to engage in a sub·· 
. . ~ d.. 1' AJh 1 h . stant1ve rev1e\v or corporate ec1s1onmaKmg. .<'l. "L ougn s. e 1s 
skeptical of managers' motives, she would rather have thern 
making the decision than a court, if the Shareholder Prerogative 
approach is to be rejected. As for Clark, based on her view that 
directors rather than shareholders should be the principal deci·· 
sionmakers, she would opt for Enhanced Scrutiny as her second 
choice after Director Discretion. 
The justices' rankings of the three approaches would there-
fore look like this:"" 
ALDEN BAKER CLARK 
1 Enhanced Scrutiny Shareholder Director Discretion 
Prerogative 
2 Shareholder Director Discretion Enhanced Scrutiny 
Prerogative 
3 Director Discretion Enhanced Scrutiny Shareholder 
Prerogative 
The problem here is that the justices' preferences"5 are unsta-
ble. If the justices were to hold a series of pairwise votes among 
"" As the description in the text suggests, my analysis focuses on the justices' 
varying doctrinal approaches-that is, their views on alternative legal "rules." 
Professor Kornhauser has argued that courts should and do focus solely on the 
"results" of previous cases for stare decisis purposes, rather than on the legal rule 
that is applied in a given context. Lewis A. Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial Courts I: 
Path-Dependence, 12 l nt'I Rev. L. & Econ. 169, 173-77 (1992) [hereinafter, Collegial 
Courts I]; Lewis A. Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial Courts II: Legal Doctrine, 8 J.L. 
Econ. & Org. 441, 443-44 (1992). Because this contention seems notably inaccurate 
as a description of Delaware supreme court decisionmaking, given the important 
(though somewhat misleading, as we will see in Part IV) role that doctrinal rules play 
in the Delaware cases, I put it to one side. For a similar criticism of Kornhauser's 
characterization of the nature of stare decisis, see Bruce Chapman, The Rational and 
the Reasonable: Social Choice Theory and Adjudication, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 41, 47 
n.ll (1994). 
" 5 In using the term "preference" here and elsewhere in the analysis, I do not mean 
to suggest that the justices base their decisions on their personal perspectives, rather 
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the preferred approaches, Enhanced Scrutiny would prevail 
over Shareholder Prerogative, and Shareholder Prerogat ive 
would defeat Director Discretion, but D irector Discretion 
would then prevail against Enhanced Scrutiny.J6 Thus, the jus-
tices not only lack a clear first pl ace choice among the ap-
--., .... r · ·- ,....1 ·=---::- hut t 1nP : l. -nreferences ~mono thP -rt-- f'eP r.i,o " e p ·rn 1n y.( ._l __ ._, n....,_,, ,j . " - '·~-'- F · .... -· . b . ~ .cc.~.i -~ a.h · .::.,., . ~ d· , -
consisten t, because Enhanced Scrutiny loses to a pos1tlon 
(D irector Discretion) that v;ould itself le;se to a position 
(Shareholder Prerogative) that Enhanced Scrutiny defeats . 
Stated differently, no matter which approad1. the justices select, 
there will ahvays be an alternative approach that a majority of 
t l ., p ·..-n a~· ·c· ··ally prefers Li v Lt..t L 11 • .._ .t • 
It is this dilemma--the inability to make a stable choice 
among three or more options-that social choice theorists refer 
to as ('cycling;' or the " Condorcet Paradox. ".j7 Kenneth Arrow 
generalized the insight with his famous theorem demonstrating 
that it is impossible to guarantee that a collective decis ionmak-
ing process will both satisfy a short list of fairness require-
ments,4~ and maintain rationality, which Arrow defined as the 
than at tempting to make objective judgments. See Lewis A . Kornhauser & Lawrence 
G . Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 Yale L.J. 82 (1986) (d istinguishing judgmen t and 
prefe re nce-based adjudicati o n, and arguing tha t adjudication tends to be judgment-
based). Rather, in keeping with co nve ntion in the socia l choice literature, I use the 
te rm sole ly to distinguish th e justices' differing views on th e fi d uc ia ry duty issue. See, 
e .g., Gordon, supra no te 33, at 362 n.35 (noting and adopting thi s usage) . 
"
6 T his is because A lden and Clark prefer Enhanced Scrutin y to Share holder 
Prerogat ive; A ld e n an d Baker prefer Shareholder Pre rogative to Director D iscre tion; 
and Baker and Clark prefer Director Discretion to Enh ance d Scrutin y. 
" Game theorists use sti!! another label, defining the p ro b lem as decis ionmaking 
vvith an "empty core ." See , e .g. , Varouj A. A ivazian & Jeffrey L Callen, T he Coase 
Theorem and th e Empty Core , 24 J.L. & Eco n. 175 (1981). It is importa nt to 
e mphasize that a cycling problem only arises if th e justices' views include at least 
three perspectives th a t cann ot be a rranged on a single -peaked curve-that is, if the 
justices ' views are mult ipea ked . For useful discussions o f these req uiremen ts, see 
Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice II, at 81, 393 (1989) ; William H . R iker, Liberali sm 
Against Populism: A Confrontatio n Between the Theory of Democracy and the 
Theory of Social Choice 123-28 (Waveland Press 1988) (1982) . !f the j ustices had 
differing views of just two approaches, or if th ey had similar views about the 
decisionmaking framework , their preferences would not cycl e. O n the other hand, 
unanimity can cause somewhat relate d problems ev en in the absence of cycling. I 
d iscuss this, and the question whether supreme court justices are likely to have multi-
peaked preferences, infra Section II.B . 
.1iJ Kenneth J. A rrow, Socia l Choice and Individu al Valu es ( i 95 1). T he most 
important of the "fairness" requirements for the analysis that follows are ''range" a nd 
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ability to aggregate the preference rankings of three or more 
• • • ,. 1... • 49 
voters m a trans1t1ve rasuw n. 
i'dthough the existence of cvclical rJreferences might other-
J t ~ 
wise pose serious problems for supreme court decisionmaking, 
the iudici al orocess counteracts this risk in several imoortant 
J .i ... 
'-N ?,ys . Fi rst , in those contexts 'Nhere the justice ~; do have cyclical 
..... • ? .. . • '1 • .--
'Pf ~:-tererlce s~ ou.tc,Jrne ~vot1 r1g tertcis to ct1sgL1.1Se tr1e ex1ste11ce f) l a 
cyc: \e by forcin g the justices to reach a decision on the case as a 
11Vf'._niP_., 11-/~'8 te VPI' f 1h "'V i1):ry· ' h ; nlr o-f rhp 1!op ::. l ~·1J o •he i 1 ''"'i("""" . _. ~- - _ , '!!f"'· 12. C:.. '· ...- . .....,. ... .. V J - _ -·· t l .! ~ .1.t..!:\.. ... 'l..l ..,..... -_.... O '-'- ! 1....: _ ~~, L . J \..2 ~ L : _, •.._, ...J 
have no choice but to decide whether or not the target di rectors 
" • J d ' . r · • . d , i() h ave V101ate tne1r naue1ary ~._: uty: 
"independence of irre levant alternatives. " The range postulate requires th a t no 
possible individual preference ordering be off-limits. Independence requires that 
each decisionmaker adhere to her actual ordinal ranking of th e alternatives, rathe r 
than, for instance, altering her cho ice with an eye to a subsequent vote for st rategic 
reasons. The remaining requirements include universality , which requires that no 
collecti ve prefe rence ordering be precluded; unanimity, or the Pareto postulate, 
which requires that the process honor any preference that eve ry individual would 
agree to; and nondictatorship, which proh ibits any individual 's preferences from 
trumping those of other individuals. Different commentators have tended to compile 
the list , which subseq uent writers have distilled from Arrow 's original anal ys is , 
slightly differently. Maxwell Stearns gives useful summaries of the postulates in each 
of the articl es cited infra note 50, based on terms first developed in William Vickrey , 
Utiiity, Strategy, and Social Decision Rules, 74 QJ. Econ. 507 (1960). See also 
Mue]lt;r, supra note 47, at 385 (foilowing Vickrey's restateme nt in compiling list); 
Riker, supra note 47, a t 116-19 (compiling list without reference to Vickrey). 
J" Transitivity requires that if X de feats Y, andY defeats Z, X must also de feat Z . 
See Mue ll er, supra note 47, at 385. The problem face d by co llec tiv e decisionmaking 
bodies, and illustrated by the cycl e described in this Ar ticle, is that eve n if each vote r 
can rank her owi~ preferences transitively, it may not be possible to aggregate the 
individual vo ters' views to produce a transitive outcome. 
50 See, e.g., Maxwell L. Stearns, The k iisgu ided Renaissance o f Social Choice. 103 
Yaie L..J. 1219 (1994) (arguing that the obligation to reach an outcome distinguishes 
courts from legislatures and forces the adoption of rules that do not reveal cyclical 
preferences) [hereinafter Misgui ded Renaissance]; ~~!axwell L. Stearns, Standing 
Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 Cal. L. Rev . 1309 (1995) 
(same) (hereinafter Standing Back]; Maxwell L. S tearns, Standing and Socia l Choice: 
Historical Evidence, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 309 (1995) (same) [h ere inafter Historical 
Evidence]. The effect of case-by-case decisionmak ing is to limit appellate courts to 
one of two principal choices in most cases-to affirm or reverse. Because there are 
onl y two options, cycling cannot occur within the case at hand, al though the effect 
may be to mask cyclical preferences across the underlying issues . 
One of the costs of the case-by-case approach is that it may allow, and even cause, 
inconsistent treatment of the issues that underlie the result In view of this , se veral 
commentators have argued that courts should abandon case-by-case voting, at !east 
in some cases . See, e .g., Lewis A. Korn hauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The O ne and 
the lv!any: Adjudication in Collegial Cour ts, 81 Cai. L. Rev_ 1, 30-33, 57 (1993) 
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Second, stare decisis reduces the likelihood of cycling through 
tirne. Because it establishes at least a presumption against re-
considering a rule or outcome that was rejected in a previous 
case , stare decisis reduces the likelihood of intertemporal cy-
cling. 'i This second context, the possibility of intertemporal cy-
clLg, is 'v'ihere the unanimity norm may actually have a destabi-
li z ing rather than a stabilizing effect on doctrinal development 
as compared to a less unified approach. In order to appreciate 
th is , consider how our hypothetical justices might address a spe-
cific dispute under the unanimity norm, as compared to a re-
gime -where they more fre quently issued separate opinions . 
Assume that Target has recently signed a pre liminary merger 
agreement with Friendly Corp. pursuant to which Target share-
holders will receive stock of Friendly currently worth $50/share 
in return for their shares of Target. No single shareholder holds 
more than 1% of Target's stock, but Manager , the chief execu-
tive officer of Friendly, holds 70% of Friendly's stock and would 
hold 40% of the combined company. Shortly after the prelimi-
[h e rei n after T he O ne and T he Many] (advoca ting " metavo te" as to wh e th e r to 
e mploy case-by-case or issue-by-issue vo ting). H owe ve r, no t o nl y wo uld such 
appro aches enta il a signi fica nt ch a nge fro m curre nt pract ice , b u t they also wo uld 
introd uce probl e ms tha t co ul d prove more tro ubl esome tha n th e o nes th ey add ress . 
See , e .g., Maxwe ll L. S tea rns, H ow O utcome Voting Promo tes Principled Issue 
Id e ntifi cation : A Reply to Professor John R ogers a nd Othe rs, 49 V and. L. Rev . 1045 
(1 996). 
; 1 For ins ta nce, in th e exampl e we have bee n cons ide ring, if a p ri o r case had 
establ ishe d E nh a nced Scru tin y as the pro pe r a pproach ove r Share ho ld e r P re roga ti ve , 
sta re decisis wou ld li mit the justi ces' ability to re vis it Sha rehol de r Prerogati ve in a 
subsequent case . In Arrovi an terms, sta re dec isi s limits the " ra nge" of a va ila ble 
decisions (because it e liminates a n option) , and in doing so preve nts the justices fro m 
engaging in eno ugh pairwise vo tes to re veal a cycle . It thus se rves m uch the same 
function as a p rohi biti on aga inst reconsidering rejected mo ti o ns in th e legis la ti ve 
context. See Stea rns, Standing Back, supra no te 50, at 1356-57; S te a rns, His to ri ca l 
E vide nce , supra no te 50, at 319 & n.38. 
T he cos t of the stab ility provided by stare decisis is tha t it crea tes path de pe nd e nce 
and the possib ility of pa th ma nipulatio n. In the exa mple just give n, fo r in stance , if a 
subseq ue nt case pitted E nh a nced Scrutiny aga ins t D irecto r Discre ti o n , D irector 
D iscret ion (which Ba ker a nd C la rk pre fe r to E nha nced Scru tin y) would e m e rge as 
the rul e, e ve n though o the r sequ e nces of cases wo uld lead to E nh ance d Scrutiny o r 
Share ho lde r Pre rogat ive . Yet standing and re la te d justiciab ili ty requirements reduce 
the threa t of path ma ni p ul ati on . See, e.g ., Stearns, H istorica l Ev idence , supra note 
50, a t 335-37. B ut see Easte rbroo k, supra no te 32, a t 820 (arguing that stare d eci sis 
should be reiaxed or abandoned in constitu t ional law cases in o rde r to red uce pa th 
dep end ence ). 
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nary merger becomes public, Hostile Bidder launches a tender 
offe r promising to pay $70/share for all of Target's stock .52 T ar-
get 's directors use defensive m easures to thwart the tender of-
fe r , contending both that Target and Hostile Bi 1der ".AJould be a 
poor fit and that H ostile B idder 's offer is highly uncertain. Hos-
·i l n; ld ... ,.·h . , . . ': 'o' rr ·t'r d" 0 l .. ]1p-··; [I .c·o ... ~ '' >}·.a rlc . c. .e D1C1 ei l . en ~ueo t C\, ge. o 1 r~.,c .. ors, a_ , ~sl£1:::,, t.D. r.u Ld\, .... .__,cl -
. h 1- ' ,.,. • l . . . f" .. . ., 
~_on to t wart, t11e te~?er one:r v1o ated ti1eu · l·j.uc,ory cuty to 
' "fO"'t's ch 31P'JOl d pr·- · · Sta b , .. .- 1'... Jl! - .J.· ...... l ....... ._, l. :). 
Under these circumstances, A lden -vvould atgue t ~ ::: t ·~l arget' s 
directors should be subject to E nhanced Scrutiny, and would 
almost certainly conclude that the directors breached the ir du-
ties by refus ing even to consider the higher bid . Und~r Baker's 
preferred approach , Shareholder Prerogative, the case is some-
what closer, since Target 's shareholders theoretically could oust 
the directors of the combined company after the rnerger or en-
tertain a future takeover bid . B ecause M anager vvill hold 40% 
of the stock, however , shareholders' voting power would be 
more theoretical than real after a merger, so Baker too might 
conclude th at Target 's directors should have considered Hostile 
Bidder's offer. 54 In contrast to A lden and Baker, Clark would 
apply a Director Discretion approach, and might well be in-
clined to uphold the directors' actions absent extraordinary fac-
tors calling their judgment into question. 
Al though the justices would hold that the Target d irectors 
breached their fiduciary duties under both nonummi:mity and 
unanimity regimes, the opinions reflecting this conclusion would 
52 T he illustration is th us something of a hybrid between Paramount 
Com municat ions v. T ime, Inc., 571 A .2d 1140 (Del. 1989), where no shareholde r o f 
the fr iend ly bid de r (Warne r) '.vould have a signi ficant stake in the combined 
company, and Paramou nt Communica tions v. QVC Network, 637 A .2d 34 (Del. 
1993), where the chief executive officer of the fr iendly bidder (Viacom) was to hold 
nearly 70% of the combined company's stock. See QVC f'letwork Y. Paramount 
Commun icatio ns, 635 A.2d 1245, 1247, 125 1 (Del. Ch. 1993). 
53 In most of the takeover cases, bo th the host ile bidd er and a group of nonbidde r 
shareholders have fi led su its see king to enjoin the targe t directors . The De laware 
courts generally !lave consolid ated the cases an d addressed them togethe r. See, e.g., 
QVC, 637 A .2d a t 36; Time-Warner , 571 A .2d at 1142. 
S.J ln U ni trin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 65 1 A .2d 1361 (De!. 1995) , one o f 
De laware's most recen t takeover cases, the supreme court's decision takes the fo rm er 
approach-and emphasizes the (somewhat debatabie) poss ibility that a group of 
man ager-shareh olders that had practical control could be unseate d in a proxy 
contes t. ld. at 1382-83. 
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differ dramatically. In a nonunanimity regime, th eir decision 
·,;vould almost certain ly entail two separate opinions, and per-
haps even three . Thus, Baker might join an opinion by Alden 
holding that the directors breached their duties , or perhaps 
' .. v:rite separately to emphasize her view that the coun sh o uld ap-
' ~ L • ' d 1> . h 'i '"'1 ' ' • p1y ::;; ::Jnare11ol er rrerogat1ve apn roac ... - L -1an·.;: o n tne other 
h :::t nd, might \Vrite a dissenting oDinion insistin
0
P that the co urt 
......... ...__ .t 
:;hould employ Director Discre tion in takeover cases, and that 
rr ' d · d • 1 1 1 1 · d. · :t arge t s. 1rectors 10 n o t oreacn tne1r ut1es. 
Unde r a unanimity norm, by contrast , thF:: justices would need 
'to reconcile all three different perspectives in a single o p inion . 
l n vievv of this, what we might expect to see is a single opinion 
that a ttempts to bring all three positions to bear. T hus , A lden 
might draft an opinion emphasizing the need for Enhanced 
Scrutiny in the takeover context, yet also suggesting that Share-
holder Prerogative is a crucial factor and that the analysis is 
wholly consistent with Deiaware 's traditional commitment to 
Director Discretion.56 
As a quick look at almost any of Delaware 's recent takeover 
decisions shows, this is precisely the form many of the supreme 
;s Baker 's decision >vhether to join th e Alden opinio n presumably wou!d depend 
on A lde n's willingness to recognize Shareho lder Prerogative as a consid erat ion in th e 
ana lysis. Thus, Bak er might adopt En hanced Scrut iny as the cour t's a pproac h, but 
sugge st tha t courts should consider the effect o n sha reholders as a factor bear ing on 
the fairness issue . 
Notice that Enhanced Scrutiny wou!d become the prevailing rule if Baker joined 
A.lden 's opinion. If Baker only concurred in the judgme nt, on th e other ha nd , th e 
case would not establish a clear approach , since none of th e options would garner two 
votes. See generally Kornhauser & Sager, The One and the Many, supra note 50 , at 
8 n.14 (distinguishing betwe en "true" concurrences that reject the majority 's 
ration ale but concur in the judgment and "two ce nts" concurrences that jo in th e 
maj ority but add the justice's own thoughts on th e case). Moreover, even if Baker 
join ed th e opinion , her Shareholder Pre rogative view could influence subsequent 
case law to the extent it was seen as a useful way of und erstand ing the maj ority 
opinion. See Ken Kimura, No te , A Legitimacy Mode l fo r the Interpre ta tion of 
Plural ity Decisions, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1593 (1992) (suggesting precedential auth ority 
of pl ura li ty opinions should vary with type); Igor Kirman , Note, Standing Apart to be 
a Part: The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Concurring Opinions , 95 Co lum. L. 
Rev. 2083 (1995) (suggesting a two-part inquiry for determining when a concurre nce 
should be deemed to have precedential value). 
56 See generally Kirman, supra note 55 , at 2099 (Suprem e Court justices will add to , 
or "deliberately cloud," their analysis to obta in necessary votes). 
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court's decisions take .57 In a very real sense , the decisions sug-
gest not a choice among approaches, bu t of all of them. In 
striking contrast to a non unanimous regim.e, the unanimity 
no rm encou rages the justices to adopt a combined approach 
that is acceptable to all three , rather than articulating their dif-
fering views on the appropriate doct rinal spproach. 5' 
1 t ~ C' )-""n;s ..._ P l~(JF -~·ry ·o covor all bar ~ .-. -~T- .-.. r cr ·~ .-.---, ...... e ......... 1, ,~ .... e {- -;1P 
-'- ! ;:'> I. L~ 1_ ,-:; , .\._) . . ,;l lv l' • '-'- · "' '•~ U.i r..L <.:\ .\1 Ci\.C\ L. ,1 O d l d ~ 
risk of cycling in a unanimity regime. J. he effect can take either 
of two form s. First, the unanimity nonn may create the possi -· 
bil ity of a doctrinal cycle that would simply not occur if the jus-
tices issued separate opinions. In the example we have just con-
sidered , a jo int opinion by Alden and Baker that em phasized 
Enhanced Scrutiny and Shareholder Prerogative, and that re-
jected D irector D iscretion, would, under ordinary principles of 
stare decisis , limit the court's ability to shift to Director Discre-
tion in a subsequent takeover case. To the extent this held true, 
it would prevent the court's takeover doctrine from cycling over 
a series of cases in a nonunanimity regime. The single opinion 
issued in a unanimity regime, on the other hand, would do 
nothing to prevent doctrinal cycling. Because the combined ini -
tial decision would not rule out any of the three approaches , the 
57 ln QVC, for insta nce, the court states that " [i]n the sale of comrol context, the 
direc tors must foc us on one primary objective-to secu re the transaction offe ring the 
bt~ S t va lu e re asonab ly available for the stock holders, " QVC, 637 A.2d <1 t 44, an 
.En harJCed Scru ti ny sta ndard. T he court then articul a tes the directors' obligat ions in a 
fash ion that emph asizes directo r discretion: "[A] court should not ignore the 
complexity of the directors' task .... Th e board of d irectors is the corporate 
decisionmaking bod y best equippe d to make these judgrnents." ld . at 45. It also 
suggests tha t th e shareholders' loss of voting power is a key factor by emp hasizing 
"the threatened di minution of the current stockholders' voting power" and "the 
traditional concern of Delaware courts for actions which impair or impede 
stockholde r voting rights ." Id. 
" Unani mity could also be seen as encouraging the justices to "cardinalize" the ir 
p re fere nces-that is, to take inte nsity of prefere nce into account-a nd , for justices 
vv ho disagree, to accede to th e wishes of the othe r justices unless they feel par ticul ar ly 
strongly about the ir views. T his perspective is consistent with several justices' 
sugges tion to me that the Delaware process is des igned to prod uce unani mity unless a 
justice fee ls especiall y strongly abo ut his or her di sagre em ent . For further discuss io n, 
see infra note 80. 
Failure to take in tensity of preference into accoun t is a freq uent cri ti cism of 
Arrow's theorem and the subsequent social cho ice li terature . See , e.g., R ichard H . 
Fil des & .Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice 
The ory , Value Pluralism , and Democratic Politics, 90 Colum. L. Re v. 21 21 (1990). 
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court could continue to shift arnong them in subsequent cases. 59 
Doctrinal cycling could, and does, occur in nonunanimity re-
gimes, of course, and this might '·Nell be the case in the hypo-
1 • • "!.. b "d . 60 ~J h ' . 1 tnet1cal we uave een cons1 enng. 1 et even w . ere aoctrma 
o~ rr- 4 ~ ':"- r- ~ , . .., 1•.......,. C."'/l•tab 1e ;-:-'\ 100-:..";l-; .,.., ... C(J~m C• ,-, ' l""'lnr:'l~-,l··.-mJ' ·>v ~.-,fl"-'·~nl" ~f:' l~ ~(:; l" ·t~ ef '-')'v1lil6 l~Cl .H '..-\1 <- 1 ~ ll1 . . tll H:-i,lL -vo., l) . .l ·r.l \1 - • • .. L.; l,.r.::tg.,. !... '""' .u -
" • n r-;r-, 1 • c . ., . . 1" Ject m a. seconct v.;ay. Jl ne 1ssEance m a smgle opm10n appea mg 
to all three approaches tends to disguise the possibility of a cy-
c!ing problem, and thus provide3 significantly less information 
f l • . 1 r ·• ,-1 • T l-. • to ~utu.re .1t1gants as to tne status oi taKeover uoctnne . ~- 11e IS-
suance of separate opinions, or even a series of close votes on 
the merits of particular cases, signals that the doctrine in ques-
rion may be unstable. 61 By contrast, a unanimous opinion is 
much less likely to provide a useful signal, and can obscure the 
possibility that the court m ay dram atically shift directions m a 
subsequent case. 62 
;-> Korn hauser conte nds tha t diffe ri ng views as to doctrinal rule can not lead to a 
cycle in th e absence o f stare decisis. Kornh auser, Collegial Co urts I, su pra note 44, a t 
178 (criticizing E aste rb rook, supra note 32) . T his a rgument seems to ignore the 
possibility that nondoctrina l factors-here , th e just ices' views on the a ppropriate 
outcome in each given case, as seen through the lens of thei r prefe rred doctrinal 
approach-can have an effect on doctrina l development. As suggeste d by the 
hypo th et ical in the text, these factors cl early can produce a true majority cycle. 
'" Most obvio usly, sta re decisis acts only as a presumption of adhe rence to an 
established approach, and it will only cou nteract cycl in g to the ex ten t it is in fact 
applied . Moreover, if Baker concurred onl y in the judgmen t, the stare decisis effect 
of A ld e n's opini o n would be limi ted, because the op inions would prese rve one vote 
for eac h of the three positions. Cycli ng-like effects d ue to shifts in th e j ustices' views 
over time, discussed infra at no tes 67-69 a nd acco mpany ing te xt, are d istinct from 
those due to concurrences . For a debate about the me ri ts of stare dec isi s, compare 
Lewis A Kornh a user, A n Economic Perspective on Stare Decisis, 65 Chi.-Ke nt L. 
Rev. 63 (1 989) (a rguing that stare decisis is d ifficult to justify from an economic 
perspecti ve ) with Jon athan R. Macey, T he Internal an d Exte rnal Costs and Benefits 
of Stare Decis is, 65 C hi .-Ken t L. Rev. 93 (1989) (arguing that stare decisis be nefits 
both li t igants and judges " by al tering the na ture of liti gants' de mands fo r judicial 
services" ). 
61 Commentators have made similar points in assess ing U .S. Supreme Co urt 
decis ionmaking. See, e.g., Easterbrook , supra Dote 32, at 810, 817 (multipl e opinions 
prov id e additional inform ation) ; Richard L. Revesz & Pame la S . Karlan, 
Nonmajority Rules a nd the Supreme Court, 136 U. Pa . L. Rev. 1067, 1105-06 (1988) 
(not ing that repeated 5-4 sp li ts in the Supreme Court ind icate an exist ing precedent 
may be unstabl e); Kolsky, supra no te 2, at 2085 -86 ("Knowing th e nu mber o f Justices 
who dissent from an opini o n and how they disagre e wili inform people 's views about 
the legiti macy and force of th e opin ion. " ). 
62 Not ice that this is a prob lem in unanimity regi mes wheneve r th e justices hold 
diverging views, even if the ir prefe rences do not actu a lly cycl e . 
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The Supreme Court's decisionmaking under the secunt1es 
laws-the one corporate law context where it, rather than the 
Delaware supreme court, is the leading source of judicial re-
view- offers a striking illustration of the informational differ-
ence between unanimity and nonunani:mity regimes. \Nhereas 
shifts in the Delaware supreme court have often come as a sur-
prise , due at least in part to the effects of the u, ~an imity norm,6' 
the tendency of U.S . Supreme Court Justices to write separately 
provides a much more pronounced warning that the existing 
doctrine is unstable . In the insider trading context, for example, 
the Justices' internecine dispu tes have made clear to even casuai 
observers that the current approach-wnich predicates liabili ty 
on the existence of a duty of the defendant to a corporation 
whose stock the defendant purchases or sells based on inside in-
formation- could be displaced by the broader misappropriation 
theory .64 The justices do not eliminate the instability by signal-
' ' In add ition to the takeover cases we have been consid eri ng, ano ther much-
d iscussed example o f such doctrinal shifting came in the context of subsidiary or 
'· freezeo ut " mergers, pursuant to which a pa re nt corporat ion merges a subsid iary into 
itse lf and e limina tes minority shareholders. In Singer v. Magn avox Co., 380 A .2d 969 
(Del. 1977), the supre me court shifted from its tradi tiona l scru tiny to a much stricter 
approach, req uiring that th e parent show the re was a "business purpose" for effect ing 
the free zeo ut. The co urt a lmost immediately re treated fro m this standard in Tanzer 
v. International Gen. Indus. , 379 A.2d 1121 (De l. 1977). It has subsequently 
abandoned its emphasis o n busin ess purpose, and has focused on ;vhe ther an 
effec ti ve in depe nde nt specia l commi ttee negotiated on beha lf of the subsidiary. See 
Kahn v. Ly nch Co mmunicat io n Sys., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994); Weinberger v. UOP, 
Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); se e a lso Frank H . Easterbroo k & Daniel R. Fischel, 
The Econo mic Structure of Corporate Law 134-36 (1991) (discuss ing these doctrinal 
shi fts). 
" Chi are lla v. U ni ted States, 445 U .S. 222 (1980), interpreted the principal insider 
trad in g prohib iti ons,§ 10(b) of the Securities Exch ange Act of 1934 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994)) and SEC R ule l Ob-5 thereunder (codified at 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.1 0b-5 (1996)), as requiri ng the government to prove the defend ant was under a 
duty to a corporation whose stock the defendan t bought or sold. C h ief Justice 
Burger argued in disse nt that th e governm ent need onl y show that the defend ant 
misappropriated information, that is, purloined it from someone. Chiarella, 445 U.S . 
a t 240 (Burger, C.J., disse nting). Justice Blackmun argued for a sti ll broader view, 
under which any trade r who had insid e information cou ld be held liable, regardl ess of 
whet he r she acquired the informa tio n in an ina ppropriate fash ion. ld. at 245 -46 
(B lackmun, J. , dissenting). Justice Powell's major ity opm10n left the 
misappropriation theory ope n beca use it had not been raised below. Id. at 236 . The 
Co urt la ter di vid ed 4-4 in a case th a t squ are ly presented the misappropriatio n issue. 
See Carpe nte r v. U nited States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). 
T he pate nt instability in th e Supre me Court 's insider tradi ng jurisprudence has not 
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ling its existence through separate opinions, although they do 
d . h " dh ' . . 65 -:._ T l re uce rt to t 1 e extent they a• ·ere to stare aec1s1s. l~onet 1e-
less, the opinions forewarn future p r.:uties, and enab le them to 
adjust their behavior accordingly.06 
T hus fa r, I have assumed that the justices ' preferences remain 
stable through time . 1Che unanim.ity norm can prod.uce addi-
tional instability if the justices ' preferences chang ~~ ove r ti me . 
Suppose, for instance, that three of Dela"Y.Jare)s justices initially 
vievved Enhanced Scrutiny as the best appro8.ch , one preferred 
~h . .id D . 1 CD" ~. . 67 A l o ,areno. er l rerogat1ve, anc. one 1 1rector l)J,scretwn . -
though .t:nhanced Scrutiny commands a clear m ajori ty, the 
court's opinion might also incorporate Shareholder Prerogative 
and D irector Discretion into the an alysis in order to maintain 
unanimity. Because the o pinion preserves all three perspec-
tives, even a change of heart by one of the Enhanced Scrutiny 
justices when the next case comes along, or a change in the 
composition of the court in the i~terim, could introduce the pos-
sibility of a subsequent cycle-like shift among the approaches.68 
been lost on litigants. The SEC continues to argue misappropriation , and the circuit 
courts are now split. The Second, Seventh, Ninth, a nd (a rguably) Third C ircuits 
accept th e misappropri ation theo ry. See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d 
Ci r. 1981), ccrt. denied , 464 U.S. 863 (1 983) ; SE C v. Cherif, 933 F .2d 403 (7th Cir. 
1991), cert. denied , 502 U.S. 1071 (1992); SE C v. C lark , 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990); 
Rothberg v. R osenbloom, 771 F.2d 81 8 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied , 481 U.S. 1017 
(1 987 ). The Fourth and Eighth Circuits rejc r:t misappro pria ti on . U nite d States v. 
Bryan , 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995); U nited States v. Cn-Iaga n, 92 F.3d 61 2 (8th Cir. 
1996), ccrt. granted, 11 7 S. Ct. 759 (1997) . 
Th e Supreme Court has rece ntly granted certiorari in O'Hagan , and thus p romises 
to address the misappropriati on theory directly this te rm. 
o; This is refl ected in the Court's continued failure, aft er nearly two deca des , to 
adopt a se ttled approach to Rule lOb-5. 
"" See, e.g., Revesz & Karlan , supra no te 61, at 1106 (suggest ing that evid e nce of 
doctrinal instab ility diminishes a party 's incent ive to rely on the existing approach 
and e ncourages litigants to challenge the approach) . 
"7 Recall th at the supreme court ordinar ily hears cases in three justice pan els. A s 
discussed ear iier, if o ne justice indicated a n intentio n to disse nt a t the pane l level, the 
prospect of a dissent would automatically trigger an e n bane hearing. See infra notes 
23-25, 31 and accompanying text. 
"' In social cho ice terms, the justices need no t engage in " principl e d voting''-that 
is, because they are not o n record (in an o pinion ) as supporting a particular 
approach, they a re much less cons trained by th e ir origin al ordinal ranking than would 
otherwise be the ce>.se. O n the role of opinions in pro moting principled voting, see 
Stearn s, Standing Back, supra note 50, at 1349-50. 
Notice that, with cases decided by three-justice panels, even changes in panel 
compositio n could lead to doctrin a l shi fts. 
-· ,..,,-.~71 
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rv1oreover, the court would have no need to announce that such 
a shift had occurred, because the in iti al opinion left open the 
option of moving to a different approach.69 
B. How Often 'vVill Cycling Occur? 
r, ·:f,....., . · . r-.. • ~1·ed ·n t 1~e last "'Pct : "' .. ""~ A-i... ,.+ .l., ..... )'""~;.,.....-.~ \'- y ~,...p.--· -~~-n,.· ..... ( .... , . --'Cclu.VlD t; cHg ~t ~ 1 ~ !1 0<.:~ d l_; il Llidl ULdHLi.llll• .l vg!,\ .e:::; cct.[ e 
s;,gnifican tly more prone to cycling than nonunanimous ones, \Vc 
novJ must address a closely re lated issue : How fre quently v;ill 
'j c ' h . rl 1 -- ? 70 cyc1es 01 tne sort ;,ve ~ave consiuerec. actually occur. 
~~ 1-, 1 . 1 r1 . ' 1 • ' J ! ... ere are severa 1mportar~ t curos on uoctnnal cycnng m 
Delav1are corporate law. Most importantly, several of the fac-
tors that make unanimity possible-the court's small size and 
the tendency to select justices with a similar perspective on cor-
porate law71-greatly reduce the likelihood that the justices will 
have multipeaked preferences. Delaware justices can be ex-
pected to be sympathetic to publicly held corporations and their 
managers, for instance, rather than having the wide range of 
perspectives one sees on the Supreme Court and many other 
collegial courts.72 T o the extent the justices ' perspectives are 
single-peaked as a result, cycling ·will simply not occur. 73 
Even if the justices have relatively similar views as to the gen-
eral goals of corporate law, however, their preferences may 
nevertheless prove to be multipeaked.H Particularly vvith con-
,.; i. t is interesting to note in this regard that none of the take over cases we have 
be en discussing were heard en bane. This suggests that th e just ices did not view any 
of the cases as reconsidering existing law, see De i. Sup. Ct. Intern al Op. P. VII(2) 
(req ui ring en bane hearing of case that co uld mod ify o r overrule es tab lished case 
law), desp ite the shifts in the cases, as deta il ed infra no te 75 , a fact th at is argua bly 
attribu tab le to the malleability of th e opinions. 
70 T hi s question is a frequent a nd importa nt one in the socia l choice literature. For 
rev iews of the literature conside ring the facto rs tha t magni fy o r reduce the likelihood 
of cycling, see Mue ller, supra no te 47, at 81-82; R ik er, supra note 47, at 123 -28. 
71 See supra no tes 17-25 and accompanying tex t. 
72 For an argument that the Supre me Cour t has become increasingly multipeaked 
in its preferences in recent d ecades, and th at it has used th e doctrine o f standing to 
counteract the risk of strategic manipulation by ideologica l litigants, see Stearn s, 
H isto ri cal Evidence, su pra note 50, a t 349-85. 
73 Rike r, supra note 47, at 124. 
" For a simil ar point about the ri sk of cycli ng a mon g sha re holders we re they given 
the auth ority to initi a te corpora te decisions on the ir own , see Gordon , supra note 33 . 
Gordon argues tha t even if all of a firm's share holders were inte rested principally in 
weaith maximiza ti on, they couid eas ily ha ve mul tipeak ed prefere nces on the issue of 
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troversial issues, and given that court composition or justices' 
perspectives may shift over time, the multipe akedness necessary 
to precipitate a cycle or cycle-like effect can easily arise. 
T he takeover cases reviewed in Section II.A are an excellent 
example. Even if the justices shared a similc.r view of the gen-
eral role of directors in corporate lavv, the d ifficul ty of assimi-
lating the takeover cases into Delaware's existing fi duciary duty 
framework could easily lead to the kinds of multipeaked views 
th at can produce doctrinal cycling. In fact , although we consid-
ered the cases in hypothetical form, they come quite close to 
embodying an unacknowledged cycle .75 
Moreover, in a sense , it does not matter ·whether or not 
Delaware corporate law has in fact cycled in any given area.76 
An incomplete cycle, or a doctrinal shift in a contex t where the 
how bes t to achieve th at goal. Id . at 359-85. In te rest in gly, this po int may be even 
stronge r with respect to the justices of the supreme co urt, since the ir views on 
corpora te law a re unlike ly to distill to a single perspecti ve li ke wealth m aximiza tion . 
On the oth er hand , th e justices obvi ousl y co mprise a dramatically sm alle r group, 
which woul d te nd to reduce the likelihood of mul t i peaked preferences. 
7S To see this, we need o nly focus on th e in itial takeover cases, U nocal Corp. v. 
Mesa Pe troleu m, 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) , a nd Revlo n, Inc. v. MacA ndrews & 
Fo rbes Ho ldings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986), and the two most pro mi ne nt late r cases, 
Para mo un t Communica tio ns v. T ime , Inc., 571 A. 2d 1140 (De l. 1989), and Para mo unt 
Com mun icatio ns v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34 (De l. 1993) . Revlon and Uno cal 
a nn o unced the E nhanced Scrutiny sta ndard, but a lso can be read as ack nowledging 
the importance of Shareholder Pre roga tive and D irect or Discre ti on. Rev/on , 506 
A .2d at 180-81; Un oca l, 493 A .2d at 954-56 . The first two cases thus rese mbl e 
Alden's prefe re nces (ES/SP/D D ). 
In Time-Warner the supre me co urt shi fted dramatica ll y, and emph asize d D irec to r 
D iscre tion. Tirne-Warner, 571 A .2d at 1153 . It al so made ge stures toward E nh a nced 
Scrut iny and Sharehold er Prerogative . Id . a t 1150, 1~154 . Time-Warner thus 
resembles Clark's preferences (D D/ES/SP) . 
F in a lly , the court sh ifted to a much greater foc us o n Shareholder Prerogative in 
QVC- emphasizi ng the fact tha t the proposed transfer o f the target would e liminate 
the shareho lders' voting authority within the firm . Q VC, 637 A.2d a t 42.-45. QV C 
there fore looks somewhat like Baker's preference profile (SP/DD/ES). 
T hus, the fo ur key takeover cases can be seen as e mbodying some thing li ke the 
cycle we con si dered in the last Secti on. I hesi tate to make this claim too strongly , 
because one could qui bble with several aspects o f this characte rizat ion. A lth o ugh the 
supreme co urt repea tedl y highlighted the effect o f the proposed merger on 
share hold ers in QVC, see, e.g., su pra note 57 (quoti ng statements from the opinion 
emphas izing share holde rs ' p light ), it is not clear that the case can be sa id to have 
adopted Sharehold er Prerogative (o r a variation on this perspect ive) as its principa l 
approach. What is cl ear, however, is tha t th e cases come qu ite close to a cycle under 
any character ization, and thus und erscore the poss ib ili ty tha t a cycle co uld occur. 
76 See supra note 62 and accompany ing text. 
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justices' preferences are actually unipeaked rather than multi-
peaked, can produce the same kinds of doctrinal opaqueness as 
might be caused by a true cycle.77 In short, unanimity appears to 
contribute in important respects to doctrin al instability, both by 
exacerbating the risk of cycles and by otherwise clouding the 
development of corporate lavv doctrine . 
'vV e have focused throughout this Part, a.nd v.;ili continue to do 
so hereafter, on the effect that unanimity has on doctrinal de·-
velopment through time- that is, we have focus ed on 3equences 
of cases, rather than on a single case. Nevertheless, it is impor-
tant to note that just as unanimity can increase doctrinal insta-
bility when the justices ' preferences are un ipeaked as well as 
when they are multipeaked, unanimity also may alter the jus-
tic~s' decisionmaking process within any given case. 
This becomes immediately clear if we briefly consider the 
median voter theorem. The median voter theorem predicts that 
if decisionmakers' preferences are unipeaked, the outcome in a 
maj ority voting regime will gravitate toward the preferences of 
the median voter, since this individual 's vote is necessary to se-
cure a majority. 78 Under unanimity, by contrast, the need to 
bring even outlying voters within the fo ld suggests that the me-
dian voter's perspective wi ll not control. As a rough approxima-
tion , we might predict that unanimous voting will gravitate to-
ward the mean of the justices' views.79 
" See Gordon , supra note 33, at 363 (simil a r point in the co ntext of shareh o lder 
in itiation ). 
7" See Mue ll e r, supra no te 47, at 64-66 (describing medi an voter theorem in bot h 
intuitive a nd qu a ntitative te rms). For an app lication to bankruptcy , see Dav id A. 
Skeel, Jr ., T he Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11 Reorganization 
Cases, 78 Va. L. Rev. 461 ,480 n.69 (1992) (chapter 11 vo ting rules focu s intluence o n 
residu al owner, which is a nalogous in some respec ts to the medi a n voter). 
7" I am grateful to Saul Levmore fo r suggest ing this point to me in con versation. 
Pe rhaps th e best way to appreciate thi s di stincti o n betwee n un a nimous a nd 
nonunan imous regimes is thro ugh an illustrat io n based o n o ur takeove r hypothe ti ca l. 
Assume that, rat he r than including three different approach es , th e justices ' views 
e ntail onl y two: E nhanced Scrutiny a nd Director Discretion. (Although I usc two 
approaches for s implicity, th e analysis could ho ld tru e e ven with three approaches, so 
long as the approaches could be arrayed on a sing le-pe a ked curve . Single-
peakedness is described in detail and shown graphically in Riker, supra note 47, at 
124-28; see also Sau l Levmore, Parli amentary Law, Major ity Decisi o nm a king, a nd 
the Voting Paradox , 75 Ya . L. Rev. 971 , 987 & n.47 (1989) (describing sing le-
peakedness)). But the justices a re neverthe less divided as to the appropri a te 
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Interestingly, however, the unanimity norm could have an 
even more dramatic effect on the justices' vievvs in some cases. 
If the outlying justice feel s particularly strongly, and the o ther 
justices are wedded to preserving unanimity, the would-be ma-· 
jority justices might move close r to, or even adopt , the outlying 
justice's perspective. Stated in soci al choice terms, the D ela-
ware supreme court's d isinclination to issue separate opinions is 
likely to enhance the justices' tendency to take the intensity of 
approach, with A lden preferring a n aggress ive vers ion o f Enhanced Scrutiny , Baker 
prefe rring Enh anced Scrutin y, but not so aggressive ly applied , and C la rk preferr ing 
D irector Discretion. Assum e th a t the just ice s' perspectives ca n be port rayed in 
simplified form o n the bar grap h that foll ows, with Alden 's view re prese nted by Point 
A, Baker's by Point B , and Clark's by Point C: 
En hanced Scrutiny _ __ I __________ I_ Director Discretion 
A B C 
Co nside r first how things would pla y out und er a regime th a t allowe d for separate 
opinions. Beca use Baker's vote is necessary to obtain a majority , th e m edian voter 
th eore m sugges ts tha t the o utcome wi ll re fl ect he r view, which is re presented by 
Point B. Und er a un animity norm, by con trast , Baker's vi ew would not by itse lf 
control , since A ld e n a nd Baker wou ld need to secure C la rk 's a pproval o f the opin ion 
in the case ; thus , they no longer have th e luxury of simply ignoring Cl a rk' s view. In 
co nseq ue nce, we would expect th e justices to move to a positi on somewhe re to the 
right of Point B, in order to secure Clark 's vo te a nd a un a nimo us o pinio n. A ltho ugh 
it is un clear how far to the right A ld e n and Baker will be requi red to move, it seems 
lik ely th a t the eventual point will be somewhat closer to Point B than to Point C, 
s ince a shift to the right of B requires bo th A lden a nd Bake r to alter their positi o ns. 
One poss ibility , as noted in the text , is that the o utcome in a unanimity regime may 
retlect the mean of the justices' views, rather tha n th e median view as in a majority 
voting regime. 
In th eory at least, if two of the justices are no t strongly committed to a particul ar 
o utcome, the distinctio n be tween unanimi ty a nd nonun a nimity regimes could affect 
not only the justices' doctrinal pos ition , but eve n the outcome in so m e cases. 
Graphi ca ll y, we can illustrate this poss ibility with a variat ion o n the chart used abov e : 
E nhanced Scrutiny l __ l _ __ lll _ ___ _ l_ Director Discretion 
A B 0 c 
Ass ume that 0 represents th e poin t where the o utcom e in the case sh ifts , such tha t 
poi nts to the left of 0 e ntai l liabili ty , a nd points to the right of 0 do no t. If una nimity 
wo uid lead the justices to ad opt a positi o n to the right of 0 , it could a lter the 
o utcome as compared to a nonun a nimi ty regim e. As suggested abo ve, such a shift 
cou ld on ly occur if Alden an d Baker were not irrevocably committed to findi ng 
li ab ility in the case. In th e tex t that foll ows I suggest anoth er scen a rio where one 
jus tice's view could tip the ot he r two. 
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any particular judge's preference into account m the decision-
·k· 80 mak-mg process. 
Unanimity thus has a significant effect on the nature of judi-
cial reviev;, both in any given case and across a court's case law. 
1v1ost dramatically , unanimity can increase doctrinal instability. 
R ecognizing this leads us to yet another cruci al q uestion: Why 
has Delaware supreme court decisionmaking not only evolved 
toward unanimity, but also retained this attribute, despite its 
apparently problematic implications? 
I attempt to sort this out in the Parts that follovv, and in doing 
so suggest that the doctrinal instability encouraged by unanimity 
is not quite so problematic as it first appears . 'vVe will see by the 
time we complete Part IV that the outcomes in the cases are less 
unpredictable than the supreme court's doctrinal pronounce-
ments. 
III. WHAT LA WYERS HAVE To Do WITH IT: AN INTEREST 
GROUP EXPLANATION 
Given the historical uses of unanimity, the most obvious ex-
planation for D elaware's unanimity norm might be judicial 
credibility. Just as Chief Justice Marshall fostered unanimity to 
enhance the standing of the early Supreme Court,s 1 Delaware's 
unanimity norm could perhaps be explained as a means for the 
court to solidify its standing as the nation's leading arbiter of 
corporate law issues. This might be part of the explanation, but 
as a full account, it is unsatisfying in many respects . It does not 
explain, for instance, why Delaware's supreme court, unlike the 
so To the extent this is true, the justices would in effect be cardinalizing their 
preferences, and thus relaxing their adherence to the "independence of irrelevant 
alternatives" postulate. Sec supra note 48 and accompanying text (describing 
Arrow's postulate). My suspicion is that something like this, which is analogous to 
logrolling in some respects, takes place to a certain extent in most collegial courts, 
and that unanimity magnifies the effect, given the added holdup power such a regime 
gives to an outlying judge. But even in a unanimity regime, it seems likely to come 
into play only on the margin. See generally Stearns, Misguided Renaissance, supra 
note 50, at 1225-26 n.18 (criticizing suggestion by Lynn Stout that judges can and 
should engage in logrolling). It is interesting to note that the Delaware supreme 
court's practice of prohibiting discussion among the justices about a case until 
immediately after oral argument, see Del. Sup. Ct. Internal Op. P. IX(l), reduces 
even the appearance of vote trading of the sort that takes place in legislatures. 
81 See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text. 
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U.S. Supreme Court, has retained its unanimity norm even after 
having fully established its preeminence in corporate law. 
lVIy goal in the remainder of this Article is to provide a more 
nuanced explanation of the unanimity norm. I begin, in this 
Part, by considering wh at the interest group branch of public 
choice theory might have to say about the significance of una-
nimity.82 Because the interest group perspective ultimately 
proves incomplete, I add a ·;ery different perspective in the fol-
lowing Part, one which vvill return us to a variation on the issue 
of judicial credibility. 
For our purposes, the central insight of interest group theory 
is that concentrated interest groups often can secure favorable 
legislation at the expense of more diffuse groups, due to diffuse 
groups' relative inabili ty to organize effectively even when they 
have a great deal at stake.8' As the heading of this Part suggests, 
our eventual focus will be on the role of the Delaware bar (as 
well as on the justices themselves). To appreciate the relation-
ship between the bar and unanimity, however, we must first 
consider the interest group dynamic in corporate law more gen-
erally. 
The interest group that appears to have most clout in the cor-
porate law context is corporate managers, due to the fact that 
they usually choose the firm's state of incorporation.84 Although 
" 2 A brief word on terminology at the o utse t. Many writers , particularly in the 
lega l literature, treat the terms ''public choice" and " interes t group theory" as 
synonymous, and as distinct from, though re lated to , "social choice. " I use " public 
choice " in its broader sense, as a n umbrella term e ncompass in g a va riety of specific 
perspectives such as interest group the ory and social choice. This accords with the 
fact that each of the specific perspectives offers insights into the nature of " public" o r 
multi-party decisionmaking. For a de tail ed discussion of these definitional issues and 
of public choice generally, see David A. Skee l, Jr. , Public Choice and the Future of 
Public Choice-Influenced Legal Scholarship , 49 Vand. L. Rev. (forthcoming Apr. 
1997) (reviewing Maxwell L. Stearns, Pu blic C hoice and Public Law: Readings and 
Commentary (1997)). 
83 Classic articles in the deve lopment of interes t group theory include Gary S. 
Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 
Q.J. Econ. 371 (1983); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 
19 J.L. & Econ. 211 (1976); and G eorge J. Stigler, The T he ory of Economic 
Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 3 (1971). Macey and Miller were the first to 
apply a sophisticated interest group analys is to corporate law. Macey & Miller, supra 
note 35. 
"' For similar reasons, th e corpo ra te lawyers who advise a firm al so a re key pl ayers 
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commentators continue to dispute whether states generally, and 
D elaware in particular, are effective regulators of corporate 
law,85 nearly everyone agrees that Delm:vare, and other states in-
terested in keeping or attracting corporations, respond to man-
agers when legislating on corporate l ir·.N . 
For Delaware , the spoils of victory a re the signific ant di rect 
and indirect payments a firm makes for the privilege of being 
incorporated in Delaware. 86 L ike the effort to attract corpora-
tions, the decision how to di vide the benefits of charter competi-
tion success may also be affected by interest group competi-
tion. 87 This is where D elaware's lawyers come into the p icture . 
One of the indirect benefits of Delaware's charter competition 
in the incorporation decision. Macey /l<.. M iller. supra note 35, at 486. Although the 
managers' and lawyers ' choice ordinarily is subj ect to shareholder approval, the 
choice is almost always approved. Commentators differ as to whether this reflects 
collective action problems in shareholder decisionmaking, or a perception by the 
shareholders that the choice is in their best interests. Compare Jeffrey N. Gordon, 
The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 Colum. L Rev. 1549, 1575-76 (1989) 
(describing ways managers take advantage of shareholders' collective action 
problem) with Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case 
for Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1599, 1606-13 (1989) (questioning 
severity of the collective action problem). 
~ 5 The charter competition debate stems, in its recent incarnation, from William 
Cary's contention that states' efforts to lure corporat io ns into the state produce a 
" race-for-the-bottom," see William L. Cary , Fede ra li sm and Corpora te Law: 
Retlect ions Upon Delaware, 83 Yale L.J . 663 (1974), and Ra lph Winter's response 
that market forces impel states to enact gene1ally efficient laws. See Ralph K 
Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection. and the T heory of the Corporation, 6 
J. Legal Stud. 251 (1977). For a review of the de bate, and an application of simil ar 
insights to corporate bankruptcy regulation, see Da vid A . Skee l, Jr. , Rethinking the 
Line Be tween Corporate Law and Corpora te Bankruptcy, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 471 (1994). 
86 The most obvious direct payment is the franc hi se taxes corporations pay to 
Delaware. Roberta Romano has persuasivel y argued that Delaware's dependence o n 
these taxes, which represent more than 15 % of De laware's tax revenues, see 
Romano, Genius, supra note 22, at 6-8 (compiling data fro m 1960-1990), effective ly 
holds D elaware hostage, id. at 38-39, committing it to continued se nsitivity to the 
interes ts of corporations. 
87 In the interest group literature, the distinction between the interest groups that 
compete for legislation, and those that provide it, is often characterized in demand-
supply terms. The groups that compete for legislation comprise the "demand" side. 
Those who provide the legislation and/or participate in the rents obtained from 
demand-side interest groups, such as Delaware's legislature and the Delaware bar, 
compri se the "supply" sid e. See Macey & Mill e r, supra note 35, at 471 (describing 
Delaware corporate law in these te rms); Freel S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and 
Inte rest-Group O rganiza tion in a Coasean Mode l of Regulation , 20 J. Legal Stud. 73 
(1991). 
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success 1s legal work for its corporate bar. Delaware's bar 
clearly is an extraordinarily powerful group, and many o bserv-
ers beiieve that the bar parlays its in±l uence into legal rules that 
maximize fi rms' use of Delaware lawyers . ~' 
Notice that the analysis thus far suggests only that Delaware's 
legislative process may ben efit both out-of--state corporate man -
agers and (more importantl y for our purposes) Delaware la\v-
yers. The unanimity norm, on the other hand, is a characteristic 
of D elaware's judicial pror.:-ess , and it is not immediately dear 
whether the interests of the Delaware bar are also like ly to in-
fluen ce the state's supreme court. 
Although judges obviously are more isolated from interest 
group influences than legislators, Delaware 's justices are likely 
to refl ect the interests of the corporate bar. The most obvious 
source of sympathy is the judicial selection process. As de-
scribed earlier, the Delaware bar plays a central role in selecting 
justices, and it can be expected to recommend individuals who 
have a natural affinity to the corporate bar.89 This n atural incli-
nation is amply borne out by even a cursory look at who is ordi-
narily selected to sit on the supreme court. Nearly all of the jus-
tices, both currently and as a historical matter, were members of 
the Delaware bar before donning judicial robes. 90 
A much-reported recent incident involving the selection 
process reinforces the point that Delaware 's justices have reason 
to be sympathetic to the interests of local lawyers. D elaware 's 
justices are typically reappointed as a matter of course. How-
ever , when Justice Andrew Moore 's twelve-year term came to 
an end in early 1994, the nomination committee declined to 
submit his name to the governor as an acceptable choice. It was 
ss See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 35, at 506-09; Lany E. Ribste in, D elaware , 
Lawyers, and Contractual C hoice of Law, 19 D el. J. Corp. L. 999, 1009-10 (1994)_ An 
obvi ous constraint on franchise taxes and on in d irect taxes such as rules maximizing 
firms ' use of De laware lawye rs is, as Macey and Miller point o ut , that De laware 's 
prim acy in corporate law requires th at th e total costs of Delaware incorporation not 
become so great as to encourage firm s to look elsewhe re. See Macey & Iv!ille r, supra 
note 35, at 505. 
so See supra notes 17-19 and accompan ying text. 
9D See Macey & Mil ler, supra note 35 , at 502 ("The members of th e Delaware 
Supreme Court are drawn predominantl y from firms th at represent corporations 
registered in Delaware."). 
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widely believed that the refusal to renominate IVIoore h ad li tt le 
to do with the quality of his d ecisionmaking-- which was , and is, 
seen as highly competent- and everything to do with his fre-
quent belittling of the lawyers who appeared before him.91 
Assmning that Delaware 's judici al process might tend to 
r• h L 1 b l . • • ' h • benent t1 e }e! aware ar , tne next quest10n 1s wneL,er unamm-
ity itse lf has th is effect. F rom at l~::asL one perspective, it clearly 
1ne~ ~ 2 A ~ n re have S"" P D <- hp ·u, .,.,r:. n;~.-l;t ' no·r-,cn C::lD rro~te a1oc C.~... ;). • --~ n • c ~ , LL ...... · Hc.<.:.tll d-) 1 ~-' a t v v a _ ·· 
trin ai uncertainty, manifested rn.ost dr?trr1atically in the possibil-
itv of cycling . Uncertainty ten rJs to benefit lawvers by increasing 
t l·~e amount of litigation (more li t igation mea~s mo~e work fo.r 
lawyers );y3 and by increas ing the need to retai n lawyers fo r advi-
sory purposes , even in the absence of litigation .94 
Y et even if the unanimity n orm enhances the value of law-
yers' services, this does not by itself assure that unanimity wi ll 
benefit D elaware's lawyers. In order for the supreme court 's 
decisionmaking process to fav or the local bar, the litigation not 
only m ust be filed in Delaware :rather than elsewhere , but out-
of-state shareholder (or corporate) plaintiffs and out-of-state di-
rector defendants95 must rely to an appreciab le extent on D ela-
9 1 See, e .g ., R icha rd B . Schmitt, De laware Governor Picks T ri a l J udge for S upre me 
Co urt, Wa ll St. J., May 26, 1994, at B7 (not ing a llegations tha t th e la w firm of 
Skadde n, Arps , Sla te, Meagher & Flo m influe nced the o utcome, a nd sta t ing th at " th e 
ma in case against [Justi ce Moore] appeared to be that he was so metim es ve rba ll y 
ab usive to lawyers and inse nsit ive to their nee ds in sched uling hea rings."). 
1t is important no t to ove rge nc ra lize frOITJ the Moore experi e nce, however. l do 
not mean to suggest, for insta nce, t hat Delaware's just ices co nsciously take th e bar's 
inte res ts in to account. R athe r, the pr incipa l point is that the se lection p rocess wi ll 
ge nera11 y le ad to justices who a lready tend to sha re the bar's perspect ive. Ne il 
Ko mesar ma kes a simi lar point , which he refers to as th e "irre le vance of mo tive ," 
with respect to the legisla ti ve process. See Neil K. Komcsar, Imperfect A lte rn a ti ves: 
C hoosi ng Institutions in Law, Economics, and Publ ic Policy 58-65 (1994) . 
9
' T h is is no t to say th at the interest group anal;,s is persuasive ly describes why th e 
unanimity norm has deve loped. I tak e up that issue, a nd express several do ub ts, at 
the end o f this Part. 
93 The amount of litigatio n need not be e no rmous in abso lute terms to ge nera te a 
sign ifica nt benefit in D e laware, which has a re lat ive ly sma li bar. A few high-pmfile 
cases each year can b e expected to have a CJ'Jcial impact . 
9
" See Macey & M iller, supra no te 35, at 504 . 
95 ! assume that b oth the share ho lder p la intiffs and d irector de fendants are li ke ly 
to be o ut-of-sta te beca use on ly a smail m inority of the share ho lders a nd di recto rs 
(and o th e r relevant interest gro ups, such as e mployees) o f publicly he ld Deiawa re 
corpora tio ns ac tually res ide in De lawa re . See, e.g ., Romano, Ge nius, supra no te 22, 
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ware counsel (rather than, say, engaging local counsel solely for 
the purpose of signing pleadings ).96 On inspection, various as-
pects of Delaware's judicial process-including, at least at first 
glance, the unanimity norm-can be seen as satisfying both of 
these prerequisites. 
As for the decision where to file a la\vsuit , the Delaware leg-
islature and judiciary have taken numerous steps that encourage 
the parties to bring litigation in the state. For instance, Dela-
ware makes it extremely easy to establish personal jurisdiction 
over any director of a D elaware firm, 97 and Delaware is notably 
generous in awarding fees to plaintiffs' attorneys. 93 Moreover, 
the judicial system as a whole-with a separate chancery court 
to address business issues and immediate appeal to the supreme 
court-is structured to assure judicial expertise and a stream-
lined decisionmaking process .99 In the fas t-paced takeover bat-
tles of the 1980s, Delaware's judges developed a norm of hear-
ing and deciding even the most complex cases in a remarkably 
expedited fashion-an obvious attraction to the plaintiffs in 
time-sensitive disputes .100 
T he remarkable degree of collegial interaction between 
Delaware's supreme court justices and the local bar gives out-
of-state litigants an incentive to rely on Delaware lawyers much 
more than they otherwise might. It usually pays to retain a law-
yer who knows , and is known and respected by, the supreme 
at 60 (noting that most Delaware firms are located outside of Delaware). 
06 Ribstei n, supra note 88, at 1011. 
97 Under De l. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 3114 (Supp. 1994), Delaware directors are 
deemed to consent to persona l jurisdiction in Delaware. Section 3114 was drafted 
days after the Supreme Court struck down the pr ior jurisdictional provision as 
unconstitution al in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 214-17 (1977). See Drexler, in 
The Delaware Bar, supra note 17, at 597 (describing the change in method of 
obtaining jurisdiction). 
98 See., e .g. , Rock, supra note 12, at 67 & tbl.2 (discussing Delaware fee awards in 
the management buyout cases). 
99 See, e .g., Romano, Ge nius, supra note 22, at 39-40. 
100 In particu larly prominent cases, the Delaware supre me court often an nou nced 
its decision and issued an order explain in g the result short ly after oral argument, then 
issued a fu ll written opinion thereafter. See, e.g ., Paramount Communicati o ns v. 
QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 36 n.1 (Del. 1993) (oral argument and initial order 
issued on Dec. 9, 1993; written opinion issued Feb. 4, 1994). Delaware's judicial 
efficiency is not limited to high profile corporate law cases. Delaware 's justices 
disposed of their cases within an average of 24.9 days after submission in fiscal year 
1995. Delaware A nnual Report, supra note 21, at 29. 
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court. 101 The unanimity norrn magnifies the value of the local 
bar. Because of the doctrinal uncertainty the norm creates, it is 
even more difficult than it might otherwise be for an out-of-state 
lawyer to gain an adequate sense of what the justices are up to 
simply by reading supreme court opinions. 
Jln a very real sense, the local bar, together vvith several 
p rominent New York la-vv fi r:rn.s that have made a similar ongo-
im:r investment in D elaware law. has become a discrete commu-·o . . f . f D , , , 1o' ,----: mty o mterpre ters o . e1aw.c,:re corporate iav;. - Jcven 2 cursory 
glance through the prominent takeover cases underscores this. 
lime afte r time, one sees the same firms representing parties 
before the supreme court. 
In short, the interest group theory of regulation suggests that 
the unanimity norm may have evolved, or at least survived, be-
cause unanimity benefits the Delaware bar, and the Delaware 
supreme court has an incentive to respond to the bar's interests. 
Given that both it and the bar have a strong stake in Delaware's 
continued primacy in corporate law, the court is unlikely to 
adopt measures that are sufficiently costly to corporations as to 
give them reason to reincorporate elsewhere. 103 But unanimity 
does not seem likely to have such an effect, and thus the interest 
group explanation may appl y. 
'While the interest group theory rings true in m any respects, it 
does not by itself explain the unanimity norm. First, the bene-
fits of the unanimity norm to the bar are not enormous, and the 
practices that foster unanimity entai l significant costs to the jus-
10 1 T here is a si milar dynamic in the Supre me Court , wh ere a rel atively sm a ll 
Supreme Court bar trades on its expertise and familiarity with the Justices. As in 
De laware, litigants have a strong incentive to turn to a me mber of this informal bar, 
rather than to use an outside attorney w1th iittl e or no experience in the Supreme 
Court. D ue to factors such as those suggested in the analysis belm-v, however, the 
incentive to use members of the De laware bar is even stronger than with the 
Supreme Court bar. For a fascinatin g study a nd discuss ion of the Supreme Court bar, 
see Kevin T. McGuire, The Supreme Court Bar: Lega l Elit ~;s in the Wash ington 
Community (1993) . 
102 One way in which this dynamic has manifested itself in recent years is in firms' 
use of "client memos" both to characterize the Delaware decisions, and to indicate in 
not so subtle terms the firm' s particuiar expertise o n De laware corporate law. See, 
e.g. , Memorandum from Martin Lipton of Wachteil, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to Clients, 
Ten Q uestions Raised by Paramount (Feb. 7, 1994) (on file with the Virginia Law 
Review Association). 
103 See Macey & Miller, supra note 35, at 505 . 
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tices. As we have discussed , D elaware supreme court justices 
spend significantly more time on an individual case than would 
be required if separate opinions were the norm. Given that the 
justices could , and in the view of some commentators do, look 
after the corporate bar in other ways at rnuch lower cost,1()4 it 
seems unlikely th at solici tude for the bar offe rs the final word 
on the unanimity norm. 
Second, in addition to the workload costs just mentioned , 
unanimity imposes another kind of cost on D elaware's jus-
tices- it limits each justice's opportuni ty to develop an individ-
ual reputation. It is much more difficult for a justice to establish 
an individual voice when she has few opportuniti es to speak 
separately.105 Together these cast significant doubt on the sug-
gestion that unanimity developed, or has survived , primarily to 
benefit Delaware's corporate bar. 
Thus, we still lack a complete explanation of the unanimity 
norm. To move closer to this goal, we need to consider another 
important, and underappreciated, characteristic of Delaware 
supreme court decisionmaking. 
100 An exampl e commenta to rs fr eq uentl y po int to is Smi th v. V an G ork o m, 488 
A .2d 858 (Del. 1985), a nd othe r cases that have e mphasized th e im po rta nce th e co urt 
places on directors having received expe rt advice fro m la wyers and inv estment 
bankers. Macey & Mille r, supra no te 35 , a t 517-1 9. A lth o ugh It is de ba tabl e ho w far 
the interes t gro up expl anati on goe s in expl a ining even th ese sta teme nts-after a ll , 
lega l and investment banker opinion s presumably do improve directors' 
decisionmaking precess-the state me nts cost th e court little and pro vide obvious 
ben efits to profession als. 
105 Thi s point assum es that judicial reputa tion is an important motiv a ting factor for 
judges, as I beli eve it is-particularly o n a nati o na l co urt o f las t resort such as the 
Supreme Court or, for corporate Jaw issu es, th e De laware supreme court. Judge 
Posner has suggested th a t "ordinary" judges (such as mos t fed e ra l circuit judges) are 
mo tivated Jess by reputa tion o r e ve n pres tige than by a taste fo r voting and by th e 
utility th ey gain from their role as e ngaged "spectators " of a case . Richard A . 
Posner , W hat D o Judges and Justices Maxim ize? : (T he Same T hing E ve rybody Else 
Does), 3 Sup. C t. Econ. Rev. 1 (1993 ). T his seems de ba tabl e as a ch aracte rization 
even of " ordinary" judges. But it is interesting to note th at un animity would seem to 
red uce the utilit y of voting to th e ex tent it !imits a judge 's ability to fully express his 
or her voting preferences. Thus, th e defection concern s I di scuss below would be 
re levant even for Po;,n e r's mode l. 
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IV. THE MORAL DIMENSION OF DELAWARE CORPORATE LAW 
U nder the standard view of Delaware judicial dccisionmak-
ing, which I have assumed in the analysis to this poin t , the una-
. . ' bl" f . . f mnuty norm nas trou mg consequences :or tne cons1stency o 
corporate law. The standard view suggests that lawyers and 
commentators should focus on the rules that the suDrerne court 
' announces in its cases, and should attempt to reconciie the 
court 's seemingly inconsistent doctrinal pronouncements. j ()" On 
this view, the unanimity norm is anything but benign, since it 
b , . . . . ,. ~ , D l 1 appears to exacer ate tne: mstabmty or tne 1 e ;:rvvare c:ase wv.;--
an instability which makes it all but hopeless to shoehorn the 
supreme court's doctrinal pronouncements into a singie coher-
ent account. 
Yet it is far from clear that the traditional perspective accu-
rately describes what Delaware's justices ·are doing when they 
decide a corporate law dispute. A closer look suggests a differ -
en t perspective on Delaware corporate law, one which gives rise 
to a richer and more benign account as to why the unanimity 
norm evolved in the supreme court. 
As Edward Rock has pointed out (in part through a careful 
analysis of the Delaware cases involving management buyouts), 
Delaware opinions have several striking characteristics that are 
largely ignored in the traditional account. 107 First, the court's 
10'' For a few of the more prominent recent efforts to make sense of corporate 
takeover law, see Lawrence A. Cunn ingham & Ch arles M. Yablon , Delaware 
Fiduciary Duty Law After QVC and Technicolor: A Un ified Standard (and the E nd 
o f Revlon Dut ies?), 49 Bus. Law. 1593 (1994) (arguing that Delaware is moving 
toward a unified standard in all fiduciary duty cases); Lyman J ohnson & David 
Millon, The Case Beyond Time , 45 Bus. Law. 2105 (1990) (focusing on directors' 
authority to take nonshareho!der consti tuencies into account); Marcel Kahan, 
Paramount or Paradox: The D elaware Supreme Court 's Takeover J urisprudence, 19 
J. Corp. L. 583 (1994) (contend ing that the cases emphas ize a "contingent a llocation 
of power" to the directors of a corporation ) . Not surprisingly , none of these efforts 
can fully explain the cases. 
107 Rock , supra no te 12; see also Edward B. Rock, Preaching to Managers, 17 J. 
Corp. L. 605 (1992) (reviewing Louis Lowenst ein , Sense and Nonsense in Corporate 
F inance (1991)). Elsewhere, I have argued for a somewhat analogous a pproach to 
Delaware law. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Saul and David and Corporate Takeover 
Law (July 1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Virginia Law Review 
Associat io n). Th e analysis of the Time- Warner and QVC decisions that follows is 
drawn in part from , a nd further develo ps, a similar discuss ion in that article. 
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opinions are remarkably na:crat(ve in torm, and tend to include 
an extended account of the events that gave rise to the parties' 
dispute . tor our purposes, the extended narrative and the 
elaborate doctrinal analysis are particularly noteworthy given 
, ·.• r · , 1 • • L • ~ l the tenaency ror courts m omer 1-lnamrnJ\.Y regimes LO evo ve 
toward short, per curiam opinions that offer only the most gen-
eral reasons for the decision. 108 Second, the court 's narratives 
leave little doubt as to which parties have or have not acted ap-
propriately- that is, of whom the court c1oes and does not ap-
nrove . • 
I refer to these tendencies throughout this part as the "moral 
~1 . . " • D - 1 \(\9 I (' . h mmens10n m , eiaware corporate ,avv. · Ji.n 1ocusmg on t e 
moral dimension, I do not mean to suggest that doctrine is ir-
relevant to the supreme court's decisionmaking process. 
Rather, I contend that doctrine is subsumed by, and in some re -
spects subordinated to, the supreme court 's quasi-moral, narra-
tive assessments of whether the directors of a corporation have 
or have not generally honored their directorial obligations .110 
There is evidence of the moral characteristics I have de-
scribed in almost every takeover case. The Time- Warner 111 and 
OVC112 cases offer particularly striking illustrations. In order to 
---·------------------
10s Se e, e.g. , Easterbrook, sup1a note 32 , at 810 n .23 (unanimity in continental 
courts tends to "reduce[) th e opinion to a stri ng of homilies"); G insburg, supra note 
7, a t 134 (noting the French practice of iss uing a single, unanimous opinion, and 
stat ing th at those opinions are written in a "formal, impersonal, concise , stylized 
manner. " ). 
109 One might a lso spe ak in terms of the "narra ti ve dimens ion" of the De laware 
case law. I use " moral" rath er than "narrative" in order to e m p h as ize the quasi-
mora l ton e of the supreme court's factual na rratives. 
110 My account of the mora l dim e nsion in the De iaware case law call s to mind the 
" literary" model o f judging developed by Martha 1'\ussbaum, who suggests that 
judges should act as idea l "spectators," conducting a particularized, yet appropriate ly 
detached, examination of the parties ' circumstances. See, e .g. , Martha C. Nussb aum, 
E quity and IVIercy, 22 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 83 (1993); 1v1artha C. Nussbaum, Poetic 
J ustice: The Lite rary Imagina tion and Pubi ic Life 72-77 (1995); Martha C. Nussbaum, 
Poets as Judges: Judicia l Rhetoric and the Literary Imagination, 62 U. Chi . L. Rev. 
1477 (1995) . One difference between my analysis and Nussbaum's approC~ch is that 
N ussba um has tended to focu s exclusively on the parties in the case a t hand , rather 
than on the instructive value of a court's opinion for future parties. As will become 
clear below, I bel ieve the Delaware supreme court decisions take both current and 
future parties into consideration . 
111 571 A .2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 
112 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993). 
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more fully appreciate the moral dimension in the D elaware case 
law, and the insights it offers into the unanimity :norm , it is use-
ful to consider the cases in slightly more detail. 
A T . "'W d 0 "V , f. n ,. , •r j • . zme- . anwr an ·~ · L rom a Nlonu t ersp :::ctw e 
As suggested earlier , Time-1Varner and O V C seem to mark a 
dramatic shift in D elaware 's takeover jurisprudence .11 3 In Time-
1-Varner, Time's directors had investigated possible merger part-
ners, including Paramount, fo r several years before concluding 
that "'¥Varner Brothers was the most promising fi t. 11 " Extensive 
negotiations between Time and Warner led the companies to 
propose a stock-for-stock merger. Before Time js shareholders 
could vote on the proposal, however, Paramount made an elev-
enth-hour bid for Time at a much higher price than the Time-
Warner merger offered. After Time 's directors refused to con-
sider the Paramount bid , and restructured the transaction with 
Warner to eliminate Time's shareholders' right to vote, 115 Para-
mount and a group of Time shareholders sued , alleging that 
Time 's directors violated their duties under R evlon and Uno-
caC16 
The Delaware supreme court upheld the Time directors' ac-
tions. In addition to concluding that the directors' Revlon duties 
were never triggered , the court adopted an expansive view of 
the " threats" that would justify directors' use of defensive 
measures to stymie an unwanted takeover bid under Unocal. 
The court concluded that a Paramount takeover was a threat to 
Time's "culture." This, coupled with the possibility that T ime's 
shareholders would be misled by the bid , were adequate reasons 
for the directors to stonewall Paramount.117 
113 See supra note 75 (describing supreme court as shifting in Tim e-Wa rn er, then 
shifting again in QVC). 
"" Time-Warner, 571 A.2d at 1143-44 (directors considered Warner Bros., D isney, 
20th Century Fox, Univ ersal, Paramount, Columbia, M.G.M., M .C. A., and O rion). 
115 The directors silenced Time's shareholders by restructuring the tran sacti o n from 
a stock-for-stock merger, which would have required a share ho ld e r vote under New 
York Stock Exchange rules, to a tender offer by T ime to acquire Vv' a rne r 's stock . Id . 
at 1148-49. 
11 6 For a brief overview of these duties, see supra notes 37-38 and accompanying 
text. 
11 7 U nder the original transactio n, Warner sh areholders wo ul d have he id 62% of 
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On the surface at least, the facts o:f OVC seem remarkably 
similar to those of Timz -'Worner. Like their counterparts at 
Time, the Paramount directors had decided to pursue a combi-
nation with Viacom as -oari: of a Iong-term plan for the ftiture of 
Paramount. 118 \\/hen cy\;c :responded to the Paramount-Viacom 
transaction by making its ovrn bid for Paramount, Paramoun t's 
, . . ' l . 1 . r-.- '" c,. · ' d F l rJ 1rectors qmcK y re.J ectec t rH': l ) '/ c ulG an · recusec to remove 
the takeover defenses that pred.uded Paramount 's shareholders 
frr-.rn COD" l·d-e'"l·nn "'-~ p -t~ ;....:J -j:),-.. t h .::_...-r ...._ ~__.., ,.....,..,..~ 10'es· .... :"10 these ~,-. -[·;~---'")r ac· ~ \-' • _ o '- .. 0 ln .~ •.\1 • .1. .,_.,,;.\ " "·~ . l.ucLu i.l ~ll b .•. , r- ·~ 1-.JL '-', . .) 
it did in Time- \Varner, the ne.ta\vare supreme court held that 
Paramount's directors violated thei.r fiduci ary duties by refusing 
to consider the QVC bid. 11 9 The OVC court repeatedly empha·-
sized that a consummated Viacom transaction would give 
Viacom's chief executive a controlling interest in the combined 
company, thereby eliminating Paramount's shareholders' voice 
in corporate affairs .120 
From a doctrinal perspective, Time-~Varner and QVC are ex-
tremely difficult to reconcile.m A s a result, most commentators 
view OVC as embodying a doctrinal shift. If we focus on the 
supreme court's quasi-moral narrative accounts of the directors ' 
performance in the two cases, however- that is, on the moral 
dimension of the cases- the divergent outcomes seem less sur-
the stock o f the combi ned company. and thus a contro lling inte rest. Even so, the 
court he ld that this was not enough to trigge r Revlon duties. Time-Warner, 571 A .2d 
at 1149-54. 
'' 8 QVC, 637 A.2d at 38. O ne of the ironies of Time-Wa rn er and QVC is that 
Para mo unt not only was inv olv ed in both cases, first as the hos tile bidder and then as 
th e target, but that it also lost in the supre me court both times . 
" 9 Id. at 48-50. Whereas the court held in Time- Warn er th at Time's directors nev er 
became subj ect to Delaware's stringen t Revlon duti es, Time-Warner, 571 A.2d a t 
1150-51 , it he ld tha t bo th Revlon and Unocal applied in QVC, and that Paramount 's 
directors failed to sa ri sfy the ir obligat ions !.inder these cases. QVC, 637 A.2d at 49. 
'~0 See , e .g., QVC, 637 A .2d at 42-43. 
'~' T he most persuasive attempt to do so, in my view, is Marcel Kahan's 
characte ri zation o f the takeover cases as entailing a "continge nt allocat ion of 
a uthority" to the directors of a corpora tion. See Ka han, supra note 106 . But even 
this view must stretch to reconcii e Time -Warner and QVC. Thus , to explain th e 
success of Time's directors a nd fai lure of Paramount's, t he approach e mphasizes th e 
fac t th at Time's shareholders theoret i c~{lly couid have received a takeover pre mium 
even after the Time- Warner merger, whe re as Para mount' s shareho lders would ha ve 
lost a ny chance of a subseq uent ta keove r premi um once Sumner Redstone of V iacom 
took contro l. Id. at 596. T his is true, but th e p rospect o f a subsequent cha nge in 
control with Time-Warner was much more theore tical than real, give n th e size of the 
combined compan y and its e normous debt load. 
'! gg-;·l 
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prising even in the face of doctrinal instability. 
167 
Consider how different Time-lVa:-n er and OVC begin to look 
if we put doctrine to the side and focus on the moral dimension 
of the opinions . In Tim e- Warner, T ime's directors' refusal even 
to consider the Paramo unt b id cle arly was problematic, but it 
was a single aberration in what the supreme court characterizes 
·~ 1" J .. • .. , .. <~ - r h • ., 
as tne mrectors oU1erw1se acrrnratHe per tormance or t 1e1r a u-
ties. For instance , the directors had considered several o ther 
fi rms carefully, including Paramount , before choosing 'vVarner. 
As th.e court underscores , thei r consideration was given long be-
fore Paramount made its last minute bid.l22 
T hough superficially similar, the actions of Paramount's direc--
tors are portrayed very differently in QVC. Chief Justice 
Veasey's opinion in OVC leaves no doubt that Paramount's de-
cisionmaking process was largely a charade, designed to disguise 
the directors' failure to honor their responsibilities as directors. 
For instance, although Paramount's directors characterized their 
merger wi th Viacom as part of a long-term plan, the supreme 
court points out that the negotiations had a relatively recent 
genesis.m Moreover, Paramount's directors never seriously con-
sidered whether a combination with QVC would make sense. 
Quite to the contrary, a chief objective of their actions seemed 
to be to exclude QVC from the nrocess at all costs. 12_. The Para-_, 
mount directors ' abdication of their responsibilities required the 
supreme court to step in, in contras t to the deference it accorded 
Time's directors in the Time- 01 arner case. 
Focusing on the moral dimension of D elaware decisionmak-
" 2 The court begins by no ting that " [a ]s early as 1983 a nd 1984 [six years before the 
transact io n with Warner was finalized], Time 's executive board began considering 
expanding Time's opera tions into the entertainment industry. " Time- Warn er, 571 
A .2d at 1143. T he court then proceeds to describe the committee and full board 
meetings that eventua lly led the directors to Warner. ld. at 1143-46. 
12; QVC, 637 A.2d a t 38 (" A lthough Paramount had considered a possibl e 
combination of Paramount and Viacom as early as 1990, recent efforts to explore 
such a transaction began _ .. on April 20, 1993. "). 
12" Thus, the opinion e mp hasizes the repeated efforts by Martin Davis , 
Paramount's chief executive , to dissuade QVC from making a bid. See, e .g., id . at 38 
(Davis "told [QVC's ch ief executive] Diller._. tha t Paramo unt was not for sa le. " )-
T he opin ion further e mphasizes tha t Paramount's directors never made a se rious 
effort to evaluate the QVC bid. !d. at 41 (board me mbers were given a "document 
summarizing the 'conditio ns a nd uncertainties ' of QYC's offer."). 
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ing thus provides a much more satisfying account of the deci-
sions in Time-VVarner and OVC than doctrine alone. It also 
raises an important question: Is my emphasis on the supreme 
court 's role as moral arbiter simply another way of saying that 
the justices decide •.vhat they think the outcome should be and 
slan t the facts to supuort fhei r conclusion ?125 Could not the 
• 1 
court have reached different results in Time-1JVa rner and OVC 
by simply shifting its characterization of a f ev1 of the facts? Per-
haps by emphasizing 'rime 's directors' refusal to consider the 
Paramount bid in Time- 1Narner, for instance, and Paramount's 
careful negotiations with Viacom in QVC? 
Given the fact-sensitive nature of the takeover cases, Dela-
ware 's justices clearly could do just this . Yet it is also clear that 
the justices see themselves as doing much more than playing 
games with facts . If the justices were principally concerned with 
defending an intuitive conclusion, they could easily achieve this 
wi th a brief, selective presentation of facts together with an ap-
plication of takeover doctrine. T he opinions take an altogether 
different tack. As I have already noted, they provide a re -
markably detailed narrative of the events surrounding each dis-
pute , so that the case becomes an extensive story about the par-
ties' interactions.126 The clear implication is that the story of the 
case is intended to be instructive , to illustrate 'Nhat appropriate 
or inappropriate directo rial behavior "feels " like. 127 
125 T he court's decisionmak in g has in fact been criticized in precisely these terms. 
See, e.g., Dennis J. Block, Step he n A. R adin & Myrna S. Levine, The Business 
Judgment Rule in Shareholder Derivative and Takeover Litigation, in Twentieth 
Ann ual Institute on Securities Regu lation 891, 963 (Char les M. Natha n, Harvey L. 
Pitt & Stephe n R. Yolk eds., 1988); Do uglas M. Branson , T he Cha ncell or's Foot in 
Delaware: Schnell and its Proge ny, 14 J. Corp. L. 515 (1989). 
126 Another possible explanation of the court's detailed narratives is that lengt hy 
factual accounts are a means of disguising differences of opinion among the justices 
in a difficult case, much as convolu ted doctrinal accounts can disguise different views 
as to th e appropriate doctrinal structure (as we saw in Part II). Although this 
exp lanat ion strikes me as plausible and probably partially accurate, my own view is 
tha t the court's factual narratives tend, on balance , to increase the instructive value of 
its opin ions; that is, they counteract rat her than contribute to the doctrinal instab ility 
we consid ered earlier. 
127 In another article, I use the Biblica l accounts of Sau l and David to explore in 
more detail the benefits of an extended narrative, as compared to a more economical 
description of background facts , in providing guidance for si mil arl y situated parties in 
the future. See Skeel, supra note 107, at 30-32. The Delaware supreme court 's use of 
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The unmistakably moral tone of the supreme court's opinions 
strongly reinforces this cond usion .128 The QVC opinion pro-
vides a vivid illustration . A t the end of the opinion, the court 
added a separate addendum for the sole purpose of chastising 
Joe Jamail, the attorney fo r one of Paramount's directors, for 
his behavior at a deposition in connection with the case. 129 1 he 
addendum announces in no uncertain terms that the D elaware 
supreme court sees itself as having an important moral role in 
I ' 0 corporate law. " 
extended narrative, a nd its e mphasis o n te llin g details , are key compo nents o f what 
Judge Posner characterizes as the "sty le " of the opinions. See Richard A. Posner, 
Judges' Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U . C hi . L. Rev . 1421, 1422-23 
(1995). 
An obvi o us concern with this approach is th at it may appear to disguise the 
contested nature of any account of th e fac tu a l circumstances und e rl ying a dispute by 
suggesting that the justices ca n di st ill the parties ' behavior to a single, objective 
narrative . Even if the narrative is debatable in its particulars, however , presenting a 
single authoritative account provides far more guida nce to future parties than a more 
hedged, openly uncertai n one would. In view of thi s, so long as the court 's account is 
general ly accura te, as clearly is true of De laware supreme court o pini ons, the use of 
an a uthorita ti ve narrative may prove especia lly va luabie eve n if it appears to gloss 
over factual uncertainti es in some respe cts. No tice that the same poin t can be made 
in con nectio n with the legal story telling movement. Although proponen ts of legal 
storytelling have bee n appropriate ly crit icized for adop ti ng a postmodern skepticism 
toward truth , whil e at the same time implyin g th at their own narratives are ''true, " 
see, e .g., David A. Skee l, Jr. , Pract icing Poetry, Teaching Law, 92 M ich . L. Rev. 1754, 
1769 & n.56 (1994) (boo k review) (citing Jane B. Baron , Resista nce to Stories, 67 S. 
Cal. L. Rev. 255 (1994)), the narra tives may hav e obvious inst ructi ve va lue eve n if 
th ey are to some extent inaccurate. 
128 See supra notes 107-110 and accom panying tex t. 
129 QVC, 637 A.2d at 51 -57 . After declaring th a t " [o]ne particular inst ance of 
misco nduct during a deposition in thi s case demonstrates such an astonishi ng lack of 
profession alism and civility th at it is worthy of special note here as a lesson for th e 
future-a lesson of conduct not to be tolerated o r repeated," id . a t 52 , the supreme 
court quotes several of Jamail's off-co lor outbursts in th e deposition. The addendum 
is a ll the more remarkable given th at Jamail had not been admitted pro hac vice in 
the case, and thus, the supreme court had no jurisdiction ove r him . Id . at 52 . 
130 Delaware 's judges a lso have emphasized the moral dimension of corporate law 
outside of th e judicia l context. See, e.g ., William T. A ll en, Independent Directors in 
MBO Transacti ons : Are They Fact or Fantasy?, 45 Bus . Law. 2055, 2061, 2063 (1990) 
(Delaware Chan ce llor describing the importance of independent directors' "se nse of 
duty "). 
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B. Unanimity and the A1oral Dimension 
Reconceptualizing corporc.te law in moral terms has several 
importan t impiications for our analysis of Delaware's unanimity 
norm . T he firs t is that it suggests doctrinal cycling m ay not be 
so 2:rave a concern as might otherwise be the case . One:: v,;e 
~/ ~ 
r::oe •)or.i 7 "' t }-.;:1 + +he C11Dro rn e CO''rt ' s ·prl"ncl"pal focu . .;: i::: o n w h "'·l' 1,?T .1.. .._...,..., .~J.l . . L\,...- i....{ .l._.... \. l u U.t / '-'J.11 U - .c. ..... ...J .. u _ _.. l_,_V \.t:.J.._._,_ 
the targe t directors have fa ithfully performed their responsibil:t·-
ties, rather than on doctrine alone, the cases are more coherent 
than they initially appear . Although Time-1-Varner and QVC' arr:: 
t., L "1 • "]• • f , . h 1 
Peruaus tne most stnKmg Llustrat10ns o tms, t .e moral De:r soc::c-· .1. I ..1. ). 
tive has similar explanatory power in each of the suprenv;; 
' . ,_ l'l court s promment taKeover cases . ~ 
Recognizing the moral dimension of the Delaware cases has a 
second crucial implication: It helps to explain why Delaware de -
cisionmaking has evolved toward unanimity. Far more than a 
regime characterized by separate opinions, unanimity reinforces 
the supreme court's effectiveness as moral arbiter-that is , in 
illuminating how directors ought to act. If the court regularly 
issued separate opinions, the justices' internal disagreements 
would dil ute the impact of the court's pronouncements, and 
suggest uncertainty as to the parameters of appropriate directo-
rial behavior. m B y speaking instead with a single voice , the jus-
tices send a very different message, one that suggests that the 
full authority of the court stands behind the conclusions that 
they reach as to appropriate and inappropriate directori al be-· 
havl." r t.; 3 ._,A o 
131 For an extended ana lysis of the De laware supreme court's (and chancery 
cou rt's) management bu yo ut cases in these terms, see Rock, supra note 12. 
t.'~ G iven the norm of unanimity , the issuance of a 5eparate opinion has a powe rful 
signailing e ffect , since it hints a t deep disagreement on the court in those fe w cases 
whe re a justice does write se parately. This is particularly true if the separa te o pini on 
ch a ll e nges the majority 's factual narrative, rather than simply registe ring a 
di sagree me nt on a procedural or doctrinal point. See generally Paul G e wirtz, 
Narrative and Rhetoric in th e Law, in Law's Stories: Narrativ e and Rhetoric in th e 
Law 2, 11 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) (multiple opinions conta ining 
diverge nt factual narratives undermine the credibility of any part icular accoun t o f 
rea lity). For a rare illustration in the Delaware case Jaw, see Smith v. Van Gorko m , 
488 A. 2d 858,893-98 (1985) (McNei ll y, J., dissenting) (extended recharacterizati o n o f 
facts unde rl ying decision wh ere majority held directors to have breached th e ir dut y 
of care) . 
t.'> Thi s do es not mean th a t the supreme court 's standards emerge instantl y. As 
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Notice that the importance of unanimity to the court's role as 
moral arbiter may also help to explain why the Delaware su-
preme court, unlike the United States Supreme Court, has con-
tinued to maintain unanimity long after having established its 
preeminence in corporate law. _t.ven if the court's legitimacy is 
clear , unanimity remains important to the moral dimension in 
the D elaware cases. 
Moreover, D ela\vare's justi ces may not be as certain of their 
status as I have suggested . Although Dela-ware has long been 
recognized as the de facto national regulator of corporate law , 
there is an obvious irony in the fact that the five jus tices of the 
supreme court of one of our smallest states wield control over 
the nation 's largest corporations. Delaware's justices are a'Nare 
both of the irony of their status, and of the continual threat that 
much or all of corporate law could be federalized at any time . 13~ 
This perspective suggests that both the unanimity norm and 
the moral dimension in Delaware law may be responses to the 
justices' understandable concerns about judicial legitimacy. 135 
By staking out a position as moral arbiter, and speaking with a 
single voice, the court reinforces its authoritative status in cor-
porate law. Thus, unlike the Supreme Court, whose credibility 
is sufficiently well-established that the Justices need speak with 
a unanimous voice only on particularly controversial issues, 
D elaware's justices maintain unanimity as part of an ongoing ef-
fort to preserve the court's legitimacy. 
Interestingly, this judicial legit imacy story appears to draw 
support from a marked increase in the prominence of the moral 
dimension in the Delaware cases in recent years. T o the extent 
Rock has shown in the management buyout context, the supreme court often 
develops its norms of conduct over time when a new issue emerges. See Rock, supra 
note 12. Rather than suggesting unchanging standards, the point is that the supreme 
court is likely to be unanimous in its pronouncements at each step along the way. 
The standards may evolve, but the court's commitment to unanimity does not change. 
134 Chief Justice Veasey's almost apologetic conclusion to the QVC decision can be 
seen as an evidence of this. QVC, 637 A.2d at 51 ("It is the nature of the j udicial 
process that we decide only the case before us .... The holding o f this case ... should 
provide a workable precedent .... "). 
135 See generally Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Resu lts and the Resuits of 
Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1371, 1372 (1995) ("modern judges 
write opinions ... to reinforce our oft-challenged and arguably shaky authority to tell 
others what to do ." ). My thanks to Ed Rock for suggesting that l pursue this line of 
mqUiry. 
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judicial insecurity has contributed to the moral tone of the cases , 
one would expect the moral dimension to be strongest in a time 
of particular concern about credibility. This in fact appears to 
be true. The moral dimension in the Delaware case law became 
most pronounced in the takeover decisions we have been con-
sidering, starting in the mid-1980s. T he 1980s were a time of 
particular concern for Delaware, in view of the repeated calls 
for a federal response to the takeover phenomenon. 
\;Vhen we combine the analysis of th is Part with the anal ysis of 
the previous Parts, what emerges is a complex picture of the role 
that unanimity plays in Delaware corporate law.1' 6 The interest 
group analysis, though problematic, partially explains the emer-
gence of the unanimity norm. But in order to more fully explain 
the norm, we need to consider the moral dimension in D elav;are 
corporate law, and the importance of unanimity to the court 's 
role in fostering appropriate directorial behavior. However per-
suasive the account I have developed may be, it is also impor-
tant not to forget a far more basic factor-Delaware's justices 
shoulder the added costs of unanimity because they take their 
responsibilities as justices very seriously, and because the legal 
culture in Delaware reinforces this.137 
1'
6 A s th e complexity of the norm suggests, Delaware's penchant for unanimity is 
ne ith er obvi ously e ffici ent or obvi ously inefficient. The recent literature on norms 
suggests that e ffici ent norms are like ly to emerge in groups tha t are characterized by 
repeated interacti on and which internalize the effects of a norm , see, e.g., Robert D . 
Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: T he Structural A pproach to 
Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. Pa . L. Rev. 1643, 1657-64 (1 996), whereas 
the ab ility to externa lize costs and facto rs such as cognitive distort ions can lead to 
inefficient norms, see, e.g. , Eric A. Posne r, Law, Eco nomics and Ine fficient Norms, 144 
U. Pa. L. Re v. 1697, 1711-25 (1996). A lthough Delaware's depende nce on attracting 
corporations suggests tha t the court must internalize the consequences of the un animity 
norm, there is li ke ly to be sufficient slack to e nable it to benefit De laware 
constituencies, as we saw in Part III. 
137 Th is was repeatedl y emphasized to me in my conve rsati ons with severa l 
Delaware justices. 
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CONCLUSION 
The literature on Delaware corporate law is enormous, and 
includes both a prominent theoretical debate on Delaware's 
status as the leading state of incorporation , and ongoing efforts 
to make sense of the Del;rware supreme court's Dronounce-
~ . 
ments on co:rpDrate lcP~v. It therefore comes as a surprise thai: so 
few of these cmnrnentators have so much as noticed the re-
k bl l • • ., L • h • ' • 1 • mar a e regu c:1nty wltn -vvrnc tt1e supreme court cec1Ges rts 
cases by a uruJ.nimous vote. 
A h D 1 ' • • 1 ' • s we ave seen, ~ · e1aware s unamm1ty norm sneas nnpor-
tant light on the nature of Delaware corporate law. First , fo-
cusing on unanimity and the effect it may have on doctrinal cy-
cling helps to explain why the D elaware case law, which. 
commentators repeatedly characterize as stable and certain, has 
at times appeared to be anything but stable and certain. Our 
consideration of why D el<l'Nare's supreme court has m aintained 
a unanimity norm offers additional insights, suggesting that the 
unanimity norm provides some support for a lawyer-centered 
perspective, and much more support for a moral perspective on 
Delaware coruorate lavv . 
. t 
More generally, the analysis has highlighted some of the ef-
fects of unanimity on judicial decisionmaking. In addition to 
magnifying the likelihood of doctrinal cycling, and producing 
analogous effects even in the absence of a true cycle, unanimity 
is likely to significantly alter the decisionmaking process within 
any given case. -~ he analysis underscores just how differently 
unanimous and nonunanimous courts behave, both within each 
case and across doctrines such as those that have been the focus 
of this Article. 
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APPENDIX A: 
DELAWARE S UPREi'v·IE COURT DECISIONMAKING 
r~ar! j)i sp~s- 1'-Rep'td I Cases wi,th- l Cases \~ith l Tota l wi~h % wi~:~'"~'"'===-,1 
il !l l1t10ns· I, dcclSI0!1s j dissents 
1
concur s separate sep~,;-,H -: i: 
I opm10ns oninions 1! it---+----~ r--- , · ------- , • 
ju 96o 1 s1 . s1 ~-~-' _____ L_o ____ +-----+--_:: __ o _____ _ J 
II 196_1 _I_~_ I 46 -+-~----~- 0 l 2.2 II 
j[_J262 I )2 ~ 52 I 1_ _______ I 0 t-_!_Y_--.=-~- ~:=]1 
1!1~:::+ :: --11--~--11- : --J ~ : c~-~~~ i! 1965 I 75 I 75 I I 0 I 1.3 Jl 
108 86 2 0 2 2.3 1 1974 
1975 214 I 131 I 2 0 2 ! 1 5 
80 1_2 -+2----+--4·----~------t 
____)_ I' ~--------1 1 
1 ~----19_7_---t-1_24_2 ____ 11 87 I 3 __ 2__ b ---~--)----+-· _ ) ___ -7 __ ____ j 1 1973 266 L 78 2 I 2 . 4 i ;:; 1 II 
I :::: I ::: -I ::: +;" L: . I : l;; -j 
1976 201 
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nl[y'"' O>;p:;i- 'TRcp'td I c"" wit_h __ l Cases \:ith-1Total with %-with-=---1~ 
tw ns I decJst ons I dis se nts' concur s sepa rate separate II 
I I I o inions ooinions ~~ 
I 1981 266 I 88 I 5 ' I 3 1 8 9 l 1·1 
ll--1-98_2_,__~-,3-l ____ l too L 2 r-~--l-s-- I s.o J 
1
:--19-83--+-33-9 -·i99L_o _ _______ j
1
. o __ o____ -t-_o _____ _j
1
1 
1~--:---1_9-&' ~-+-, _;_o~_, _--_-+-~--,1 2 _ ___ o ___ _____,_ 2 3.2 _ __j, 
1
1
1-l_98~5-r-_3_53 ___ L 71 . 3 ' 1 4 5.6 II 
1986 360 i 60 I l l b I 2 ~ ~~ 
[-19-87--~,--3-;;-----r--;-6 -1~---- o -L o · 0-- _ / 
1\jf-1_9_ss____,l_4_o7 ___ 1 n 1 o 1 t.4 I 
1989 482 89 .) 0 3 3.4 
I
I 199o 382 69 2 • 2 4 1 s .8 
1~1~99~1-~4_1_o_~ ___ 6_4_-+ __ o ______ -+ __ o _____ -r __ o ______ -r ___ o ____ ~!j 
1992 490 71 l 0 1 1.4 Jl 
1993 448 s8 o o o o I 
1 994 406 I s4 o 1 1 1. 9 
ll-1--'99-5--1-4-7-1 ---r 69 4 • --+-0----+--4---+---5-.8--~ 
1996 467 90 I 2' 1 3 3.3 
Total 8959 1 2982 66 1 23 1 s9 3.o 
' O nl y re ported decisions were ava ilable from 1960-73. 
' O ne of these was a corporate law decision. T he court iss ued se parate op inions in 
15 corpora te cases overa ll. 
' Several cas es included bo th concurrences and dissents. I have trea ted these as 
di ssents. 
The data used in compiling these charts was obta ined by running severa l searches 
in WESTLA W's DE-CS data base. The number o f tota l dispositions in a yea r was 
obta ined by running the search "Co(high) & DA(19xx) ," where 60-95 were subs ti-
tuted for "xx" in consccuti,;e searches. The number of published decisions in a yea r 
was obtained by addi ng to each total disposition search the qualifier "% ((tab le /6 
published) ( table /2 captioned) ) ." This search e limi nated nearly all of the unpub-
li shed decisions. Remaind ers were eliminated by browsing the search results in "CI" 
mode. The number of dissen ts an d concurrences in a year was obtained by add ing to 
each total disposition search the qualifier "& disse nt! concur!. " The search results 
were then browsed to confirm that each was in fact a concurrence or d issen t. Each 
case where a concurrence or disse nt did in fact appear was loosely categorized by 
type of case at this time . 
